

*Vadym Zheltovskyy*\*

## **From Transaction to Transformation: Explaining the Leadership Shift on EU Sanctions Policy Against Russia**

### **Abstract**

The article examines the leadership shift toward the EU sanctions policy against Russia in context of ongoing reconsideration of *status quo* that was caused by full-scale Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The author draws attention to the transformation of the EU political leadership and their vision on the matter of foreign policy-making as a response to Russian aggression. Particular focus is put on the comparative analysis of competition outcomes between transactional and transformational viewpoints on sanction policy against Russia in years 2014–2021 and since February 2022.

**Keywords:** European Union, Sanctions, Transformational Leadership, Foreign Policy, Structural Power

### **Introduction**

On 24 February 2022 the Russian Federation launched a full-scale illegal invasion of the territory of Ukraine that led to a wide range of implications not only for Ukrainian state but for the world stability and security in future as well. Such unprecedented act of aggression has led to unprecedented response from the Collective West and European Union (EU) in particular. In fact, there have been repeated political declarations and appeals issued by key individual (heads of states and governments) and collective institutional actors (i.e. European Parliament (EP)) on the need to transform Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU.

---

\* **Vadym Zheltovskyy** – University of Warsaw, e-mail: v.zheltovskyy@uw.edu.pl, ORCID ID: 0000-0002-4403-0557.

It is the EU sanction policy against Russia that has undergone a significant shift in the aftermath of Russian full-scale aggression. Such shift has vividly illustrated the dominance of transformational approach in the EU response to Russia's war on Ukraine. That came together with the shift in the EU leadership toward the prospects of strengthening the EU structural power in its foreign policy competition with Russia.

Therefore the major purpose of the article is to analyse the impact of the political leadership shift on the revision of the EU sanction policy against Russia as an instrument of CFSP. In order to achieve the stated purpose the article poses a research question referring to the key factors that define the essence of EU leadership in context of declared transformation of common foreign policy. The author puts forward the argument that based on the previous experience in the field of sanction policy against Russia, as well as other entities on which restrictions were imposed, it can be assumed that the effectiveness of such measures will depend not only on their duration but also on the international synchronization of such actions and sustainable character of transformational nature of political leadership.

As for the structure of the article, it goes as follows: the following section briefly explains the methodology and research framework. Furthermore, there is made an attempt to study the impact of factors defining the position of key institutional and individual political actors on the essence of the sanction policy and its purpose. Given part makes an attempt to verify two hypotheses regarding evolution of the EU sanction policy against Russia and its implications for the EU structural potential in the region.

## **Methodology and Research Framework**

Among methods used in the research the article employs the following ones: a case study of Russia's war on Ukraine as a trigger of EU foreign policy transformation; process tracing method and content analysis of selected speeches, resolutions and recommendations on EU sanction policy. To be more precise, the case study method provides an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of Russian invasion of Ukraine and its impact on the transformational change of the EU member states' and institutional approach toward foreign policy making. It is used to illustrate the essence of political leadership in France and Germany as key EU advocates for the transactional nature of relations with Russia before the full-fledged invasion. On the other hand, the accent on political leadership of such institutions as European Council, European Commission (EC) and European Parliament (EP) is used to summarise the directions of planned revision in the field of CFSP.

Meantime the empirical part of the article is based on two leading methods: process tracing and content-analysis. The methodology of process tracing is employed in order to conduct an interpretative analysis of political developments in the relationship between EU and Ukraine regarding the support of the European integration perspectives for Ukraine and increasing economic pressure on Russian Federation. On the other hand, content analysis was applied in terms of the qualitative research of selected EU parliamentary debates and rhetorical addresses by EU institutional leaders on the broad topic of the EU foreign policy transformation in light of Russia's full-scale invasion.

Conceptually, the paper uses the notion of transformational leadership defined by James MacGregor Burns (1978) and Bernard Bass (1985). In accordance with the leadership concept of Burns (1978), there are two basic types of political leadership: transactional and transformational. The key difference between the two is that transformative leadership is always characterized by complex, long-term political goals and a moral aspect that influences the decision-making process. According to Burns (1978, p. 4), transformational leaders use their influence to establish a long-term vision by challenging the prevailing culture and encouraging their followers to change their minds. In other words, transformational leadership involves structural changes in the beliefs, needs, and values of followers. To this end, transformational leaders appeal to both rational and emotional arguments to win the hearts and minds of their followers. Transactional leadership, in turn, consists in carrying out transactions (i.e. actions taken in a certain way to obtain the desired results in return) with the other party, i.e. international partners, voters, etc. In this context, the analysis of EU foreign policy towards Russia before 24 February 2022 indicates that the EU foreign policy was based on a transactional approach.

In his turn, Bass (1985, p. 7) points out four roles for transformational leadership: 1) inspirational motivation – or an ability to encourage followers to believe in leader's vision and the need of fundamental transformation; 2) idealised influence meaning that a leader is presented as a role model for other followers; 3) individualised consideration of needs and expectations of particular follower or group of followers; 4) intellectual stimulation that is expected to motivate followers to create new ways of thinking about particular situation or about a particular actor (individual or collective).

In this regard, the research focus on the Ukrainian case as a trigger of the EU sanction policy transformation from transactional to transformational in light of full-scale Russian invasion argues for the

need to study the impact of particular institutions as collective actors and their leadership potential. Such focus gives ground to reflect on whether the EU institutions might become a transformative structural power as far as the EU-Russia relations are concerned and how successful the EU structural foreign policy has been in exercising the economic pressure on Russia since 24 February 2022.

### **Shift of the EU Sanction Policy Against Russia and Its Foreign Policy Implications – Testing Hypotheses**

The following section of the article is based on the interpretative analysis of the political dimension of the EU decision-making process on sanction policy against Russia and, particularly, the impact of political leadership on reaching compromise between member states. In fact, the balance of the EU-Russia structural foreign policy competition in the Eastern partnership region before the Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has illustrated the dominance of transactional approach of the EU institutions aimed at keeping status quo in given bilateral relations (Zheltofskiy, 2020, p. 76). Meantime there has been a significant increase of the transformational leadership in the approach of the EU institutions toward their response to growing Russian aggression (Zheltofskiy, 2022, p. 674).

In order to present the coherent comparative perspective of the policy shift, it is necessary to divide the analytical framework into two chronological stages: 2014–2021 and 2022–2023. To be more precise, while analysing the developments in post-February 2022 invasion the following milestones are taken into consideration:

1. 24.02.2022–23.06.2022 – from full-scale Russian military invasion of Ukraine to the decision of the European Council to grant candidate status to Ukraine;
2. 24.06.2022–30.09.2022 – from the decision of the European Council to grant candidate status to Ukraine to its formal application for a fast track NATO membership;
3. 1.10.2022–23.11.2022 – from Ukraine's formal application for a fast track NATO membership to the resolution of the European Parliament designating Russia as a „state sponsor” of terrorism due to its actions in Ukraine.
4. 24.11.2022–17.03.2023 – from the resolution of the European Parliament designating Russia as a „state sponsor” of terrorism due to its actions in Ukraine to warrant arrest against Vladimir Putin issued by the International Criminal Court.

***Hypothesis 1. EU Sanction Policy Against Russia in Years 2014–2021 Was Dominated by Transactional Approach Aimed at Maintaining Status Quo With Russia***

To start with, given hypothesis has been positively verified. Before the full-scale Russian aggression in 2022, the main problem in maintaining a common position among the Western allies was the desire to maintain their own economic relations with the Kremlin. It is the over-reliance of some European countries on energy or investments from Russia that is considered to be the main impeding factor. In turn, even the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 did not contribute to the rapid development of a containment strategy, especially in the sanction policy. On the contrary, it showed the inconsistency of views among EU countries on future cooperation with Russia. Moscow, in turn, successfully sought to tighten ties with selected European governments, thus trying to show not only the fragility of the Western community, but also the superiority of its own alternative system, upholding “conservative values and traditions”. As a result, some countries, relatively heavily dependent on the Russian market, aware of the political and economic costs associated with the expansion of the sanction policy, openly criticized the proposed actions, which made the prospects for their continuation at a critical moment seem far from promising (Portela et al., 2021, p. 684).

Speaking about the reluctance of individual states for taking deeper, more severe sanctions measures, Kanter mentions, among others, the importance of natural gas imports to Germany, the UK’s banking links with Russia, and the significance of the arms sector agreements signed between France and Moscow (Kanter, 2014). Undoubtedly, the decisions taken in Germany and France had the greatest impact on the shape of the EU’s foreign policy, as these are the two largest economies in the region.

The reasons for this passive attitude should be sought in the fear of the catastrophic consequences of the deterioration of relations between Berlin and the Kremlin. Therefore, Germans considered Moscow’s actions partially understandable. Berlin used to take several measures to de-escalate the conflict, realizing that radical political and economic sanctions against Russia will also hit the German economy, which is a measure of prosperity and state stability. An open conflict is also at odds with the German strategy, based on far-reaching “respect for the EU’s most important neighbor and its interests” (Forsberg, 2016, pp. 20–21).

It is indirectly related to the so-called Ostpolitik,<sup>1</sup> founded in the 1970s, assuming “change through rapprochement” (Forsberg, 2016, p. 21), and its later variations, i.e. Neue Ostpolitik or Partnership for Modernization, which was dominated by the slogan “change through connections” (in German: *Annäherung durch Verflechtung*) (Popławski, Kwiatkowska, 2014, p. 2). According to this assumption, Russia was perceived as a key geopolitical partner of the European Union, with whom cooperation, even at the price of far-reaching concessions, was necessary to maintain a stable European security order. One of the main reasons for the ambiguous attitude of Germany was also the lack of knowledge about Ukraine, common not only among the social masses but even among Berlin political circles, think tanks, and institutions.

Meantime, there is no doubt that Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine in 2014 significantly weakened the influence of the Ostpolitik logic. However, German politicians, including former German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, even then emphasized the need to get closer to Putin. In an interview with the “*Süddeutsche Zeitung*”, Genscher noted that while the West does not have to agree to the annexation of Crimea, it must continue talks with the other side to “enable a new beginning in East-West relations” (Stadler, 2015). Later on, already in 2018, Heiko Maas, i.e. the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the plan of the New European Ostpolitik, which showed a return to the traditional approach based on continuing dialogue with the Kremlin (Rącz, 2022, p. 3). The new German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz,<sup>2</sup> despite taking a less conciliatory stance towards Russia, also emphasized that the EU must be united in its decisions and in the process of seeking further dialogue between the parties in conflict. In December 2021, he proposed another concept in the field of Ostpolitik, at the same time warning Russia of the consequences if it decides to violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity in any way (Donahue, Delfs, 2021).

As far as France is concerned, since the end of World War II, its official position was to maintain positive relations with Russia, hoping that this country would be a suitable counterbalance to the United States and slowly rebuilding Germany. Its policy was already based on deep

---

<sup>1</sup> A strategy based on West Germany’s cooperative approach to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, which has been developed in Germany since 1969. The author of this policy is former Chancellor Willy Brandt. An example confirming this indulgent attitude towards the USSR was Germany’s readiness during the Cold War to become more involved in energy cooperation with Moscow, especially in the field of gas supplies, pipelines and nuclear projects.

<sup>2</sup> The new German government, led by Mr. Scholz, was sworn in on 8 December 2021.

individualism and self-interest (Menkiszak, 2021, p. 11). De Gaulle, as well as his successors, more or less continued the policy of independence and striving for global stability. Franco-Soviet and later Franco-Russian relations went beyond bilateral issues, seeking to maintain the overall balance on the continent, which was considered an overriding goal.

As a reaction to Russian concerns about NATO's eastward expansion, on 19 March 1995, at a meeting of foreign ministers of the European Union Member States in Carcassonne, France put forward a proposal to conclude an appropriate agreement with the Kremlin in order to maintain mutual, relatively favorable relations. Ultimately, after NATO started actual negotiations with Russia, France sought to take an active role in the talks between the parties in order to work out a compromise final document that would primarily satisfy Paris (Helnarska, 2015, p. 72).

According to the 2013 White Paper on Defense and National Security, Paris considers both the "threat of force" that might be used by military powers and the "risk of weakness" posed by failed states, thereby recognizing that any possible vulnerability threats should be identified as early as possible and then effectively countered before they can wreak the greatest havoc (French Ministry of Defence, 2013, p. 40).

The nature of Russia-Germany and Russia-France bilateral relations had a profound impact on the position of Germany and France toward the scale of support for the European integration processes in such states as Ukraine. As for public opinion towards successive sanctions, in March 2014 (after the annexation of Crimea), only 43% in Germany and France were in favour of the further trade sanctions against Russia. Also over 64% of Germans were against severing diplomatic relations with Russia (YouGov, 2014).

To sum up, despite the ongoing debate on the need to transform the decision-making process of the CFSP (Tosiek, 2020, pp. 154–155) there was continued lack of political will among key European states to finalise given transformation and strengthen the structural potential of the EU in its foreign policy competition with Russia after its illegal annexation of Crimean peninsula. That resulted in dominance of the transactional leadership style in the decision-making on CFSP that was aimed at maintaining business relations with Russia. What is more, it led to the breach of the political-diplomatic sanctions of some member states and thus weakened the credibility of the EU as a collective actor in the eyes of Russia (Secrieru, 2015, pp. 82–83). In all probability, described lack of the unity between member states on sanction policy also was taken into account by Russian authorities while undertaking the decision of launching a barbaric full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022.

***Hypothesis 2. EU Sanction Policy Shift is Directly Dependent on Type of Transformational Political Leadership of the EU Decision-Makers***

Since February 2022 the European Council and the Council of the European Union have been meeting regularly to discuss the situation in Ukraine from different perspectives. The analysis below makes a chronological attempt to illustrate the economic, political and diplomatic instruments that were implemented to build the EU structural power and transform the strategical framework of foreign policy objectives.

To start with, the attention should be paid to the political signals sent at the meeting of the European Council on 24 of February 2022. The conclusions of the European Council meeting included a clear political message to Russia expressing the following:

- strong condemnation of „Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine”;
- demands to immediately cease military actions unconditionally and withdraw all Russian forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine;
- strong condemnation of the involvement of Belarus in Russian aggression against Ukraine;
- announcement of the intention of urgent preparation and adoption of sanction policy measures;
- appeal to international community to not recognise the two self-proclaimed separatist entities and respect the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine.

As a result, the EU has imposed first package of sanctions on Russia that covered the financial, energy and transport sectors, dual-use goods as well as export control and export financing, visa policy, additional listings of Russian individuals and new listing criteria and expressed readiness to provide Ukrainian people with additional political, financial, humanitarian and logistical support (European Council, 2022).

Russian invasion of Ukraine served as a trigger for the transformational changes in the attitude of the EU institutions, individual authorities and member states to the sanction program. As Kim B. Olsen and Simon FASTERKJÆR KJELDSØN emphasize, states previously focused only on the goals of sanctions and the process of designing them. Their further implementation, however, was not always successful, with the states presenting a different scope of application of the sanctions, as well as their intensity. In order to increase the effectiveness of EU actions, it is necessary to move from an individual approach, based on own economic interests, to multidimensional and long-term cooperation of entities



guided by the same moral values, regardless of additional costs (Olsen, FASTERKJÆR, 2022, p. 2). To repeat, according to Burns, these are moral values, transformational vision and long-term planning that are the most important constituents of transformational leadership (Burns, 1978).

The analysis of rhetorical strategies in the context of transformational changes in the EU foreign policy and its prospective structural foreign policy competition with Russia makes it possible to define four main narratives promoted by the EU institutional leadership:

1. EU as an independent actor in geopolitical relations;
2. EU as a transformational power on the international arena;
3. EU as a promotor of European values among member and non-member states;
4. “special responsibility” of the EU toward Ukraine in light of Russia’s military aggression (Zheltovskyy, 2022, p. 673).

The last point seems to be of particular importance when it comes to the transformation of the EU strategic vision and formula of cooperation with Russia. Another step of equal importance is to develop a long-term strategy for the transformation of the Eastern Partnership region and to bring the issue of enlargement back to the table. As far as the analysis of EP transformational leadership is concerned, it is possible to state that there has been a significant evolution of the EP leadership approach to such crucial issue as the eastern dimension of the EU neighbourhood policy. What is more, the text of EP resolutions has brought moral constituent to the core of the decision-making process on the future of the EU enlargement policy. Furthermore, the transformational nature of the EP position toward the Russian aggression against Ukraine served as a motivation factor leading to the advance to a higher level of morale and motivation among political leaders of the EU institutions such as the European Council or European Commission (Zheltovskyy, 2022, p. 676).

The position of the EU institutions summarised above led to a change of perception within the EU and unprecedented challenge of creating one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes. As it was shown in previous part of given section, the enforcement of sanctions is technically complex and entails additional economic costs and the risk of political destabilization in the system. The European Union, which previously paid most attention only to the process of creating procedures, focused on sanctions as a deterrent and preventive factor, but not a remedy. The lack of effectiveness of actions taken after 2014 was another aggression of Russia against Ukraine. In fact, this argument was repeatedly used by Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his rhetorical campaign on strengthening international sanctions against Russia (Khudoliy, Zheltovskyy, 2023, p. 19).

Meantime, in order to improve the effectiveness of the EU sanction program, it is necessary to make changes also at the level of Member States, and more precisely – in their approach to respecting EU rules. States largely control the flow of particular information to the Commission and they themselves oversee which of their national authorities is responsible for carrying out sanctions-related tasks at national level. The main problem, however, is incoherent, diversified structures that make it difficult for EU institutions to oversee the entire process. Indeed, the Commission launched various reform initiatives after the 2022 aggression to improve its capacity to oversee law enforcement practices in Member States. The example here is the Sanctions Information Exchange Repository, for faster exchange of information directly between countries and the Commission, and the sanctions expert group, which advises states on EU law enforcement.

At this point, it is worth noting a shift in foreign policy of France and Germany. The government led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz decided to move even further away from the old concept of accepting the aggressive policy of a third country. In this way, successive stages and red lines of German foreign policy were slowly crossed. Germany voted for the introduction of severe sanctions against Russia, which automatically affected its economic efficiency, but also opted for the suspension of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. In addition, they joined several other NATO members in supporting the Ukrainian side in the fighting by supplying not only defensive weapons but offensive ones as well.

France, due to its military potential and possession of nuclear weapons, perceived Russia through the prism of the security policy of the European continent. After the peace talks between the French president and the Kremlin did not bring many results, Paris seems to be slowly moving away from its previous policy of not rejecting Russia. In his speech to European Parliament on 9 May 2022 President Macron acknowledged that 'new geopolitical context' created by Russia's war on Ukraine requires new approach to political cooperation in Europe (Macron, 2022). In accordance with the proposal of French president the European Political Community as a platform for political coordination was inaugurated on 6 October 2022 in Prague.

As for opponents of strengthening EU sanction policy against Russia, the position of Hungary vividly illustrates the complexity of the decision-making process on foreign policy issue at the forum of European Council. Constant opposition to resigning from the transactional model of relations with Russia that has been repeatedly declared by Viktor Orbán argues for the need to reconsider the application of veto in favour of qualified

majority vote on CFSP. That, however, would require revision of the treaties which is another controversial topic for EU Member States. In the meantime, inability to reach consensus on the forum of European Council may result in the tendency of building alliances aimed at helping Ukraine. That in turn may lead to the creation of multiple centres for solving common problems in Europe and thus may result in individual action and lack of coordination with the EU institutions. Such a scenario is exactly opposite to the mainstream vision of the EU that is able to speak with one voice on crucial foreign policy matters.

Overall, one could have noticed a profound change in the approach of EU member states toward the issue of EU-Russia relations in light of war crimes and atrocities committed by Russian troops in Ukraine. It remains to be seen, however, whether the EU sanction policy shift will result in the long-lasting political compromise on strengthening sanction policy against Russia and impossibility of return to the transactional approach of “business as usual”. In other words, the central question is whether member states will be able to sustain the “commonality of purpose” in context of EU-Russia relations (Maurer et al., 2023, p. 231).

To sum up, the conducted interpretative analysis has demonstrated a direct link between a significant shift in the EU sanction policy and transformational leadership approach to the CFSP reform which gives arguments in favour of positive verification of the second hypothesis. Given approach has been based not only on economic (transactional) effects of foreign-policy making but for the first time – on such features of transformational leadership as moral aspect of undertaken actions and long-term goals of prospective changes.

## Conclusions

In summary, as the above analysis of the EU leadership style on sanction policy shift has demonstrated, Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to considerable progress in the transformation of the EU approach to foreign policy-making. By introducing a new strategic vision based on morality issue and long lasting objectives, the EU as a collective body has started the discussion of irreversible changes of its structural potential on the international arena.

Transformational shift of the EU sanction policy against Russia has not been a quick one and was directly linked to the leadership style executed by the EU institutional and state actors. As the conducted study has illustrated, the reluctance of the EU member states to resign from the transactional approach to the EU-Russia relations was primarily caused

by long-lasting tradition of trade with Russia or their dependence on Russian energy resources.

As a matter of fact, the position of the EU institutions, both supranational and intergovernmental, toward the sanction policy has vividly reflected the complexity of the EU foreign policy and prospects of its strategic objectives. Russia's war on Ukraine has shown the weaknesses of the EU position undertaken toward the democratisation processes in its eastern neighbourhood before 2022. Moreover, it triggered the discussion on the need for the EU to set clear foreign policy agenda that would cover issues which for long time were politicised such as the process of the EU enlargement.

In fact, one could have noticed a change of the political discourse on the issue of enlargement and reconsideration of the EU eastern policy in favour of transformational vision that does not prioritise Russian interests over the interests of Ukraine and other neighbours of the EU. In this case, the EU ability to become a proactive actor in the region and a transformative power toward the candidate states will define the future of democratisation processes in given states. For the time being, the basic question, however, is whether member states will manage to achieve long-lasting consensus on maintaining the transformational approach to the prospective EU-Russia relations. In this regard, the future of veto option in the decision-making procedure of CFSP will remain an important factor defining the prospects of the enlargement policy that was brought back to the European political agenda.

## References

- Bass, B.M. (1985) *Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations*. New York: Free Press.
- Burns, J. MacGregor (1978) *Leadership*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Burns, J. MacGregor (2003) *Transforming Leadership: A new Pursuit of Happiness*. New York: Grove Press.
- Donahue, P. and Delfs, A. (2021) "Scholz Proposes New EU *Ostpolitik* to Ease Tensions With Russia", *Bloomberg*. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-15/scholz-proposes-new-eu-ostpolitik-to-ease-tensions-with-russia> (Access 7.09.2023).
- Drzewicki, A. (2019) „Problem NATO w relacjach niemiecko-ukraińskich w XXI wieku. Zarys zagadnienia”, *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych*. Vol. 11(47), pp. 53–78.
- European Council (N.D.) *How and when the EU adopts sanctions*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/different-types/> (Access 20.01.2023).

- European Council conclusions. 24.02.2022. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/24/european-council-conclusions-24-february-2022/> (Access 7.09.2023).
- Forsberg, T. (2016) „From Ostpolitik to *frostpolitik*? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia”, *International Affairs*. Vol. 92(1), pp. 21–42.
- French Ministry of Defence (2013) *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*.
- Helnarska, K. (2015) „Polityka zagraniczna Francji wobec Rosji w sektorze energetycznym”, *Nowa Polityka Wschodnia*. Vol. 2(9), pp. 66–84.
- Hutchison, E. (2016) *Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kanter, J. (2014) “EU meets to consider more sanctions on Russia”, *The New York Times*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/world/asia/eu-meets-to-consider-moresanctions-on-russia.html> (Access 7.09.2023).
- Khudoliy, A. and Zheltovskyy, V. (2023) „Rhetorical argumentation as a public action: the case of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s presidential rhetoric”, *Online Journal Modelling The New Europe*. Vol. 42, pp. 4–21. DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2023.42.01.
- Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, A. and Popławski, K. (2014) “The German reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict – shock and disbelief”, *Centre for Eastern Studies*. Vol. 132. Available at: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-04-03/german-reaction-to-russian-ukrainian-conflict-shock-and> (Access 7.09.2023).
- Macron, E. (2022) *Speech by president Macron on European Political Community*. Available at: <https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20221120100155/https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/> (Access 7.09.2023).
- Maurer, H., Whitman, R. and Wright, N. (2023) „The EU and the invasion of Ukraine: a collective responsibility to act?”, *International Affairs*. Vol. 99(1).
- Menkiszak, M. (2021) *Mów do mnie jeszcze. Rosja wobec inicjatyw détente Macrona. Punkt widzenia*. Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia.
- Olsen, K.B. and FASTERKJÆR, K.S. (2022) “Strict and Uniform. Improving EU Sanctions Enforcement”, *DGAP Policy Brief* 29. Available at: <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/strict-and-uniform-improving-eu-sanctions-enforcement> (Access 7.09.2023).
- Portela, C., Pospieszna, P., Skrzypczyńska, J., and Walentek, D. (2021) “Consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia”, *Journal of European Integration*. Vol. 43(6), pp. 683–699.

- Rącz, A. (2022) “Germany’s shifting policy towards Russia: The sudden end of Ostpolitik”, *FIIA Briefing Paper*. Vol. 335, pp. 1–7.
- Secieru, S. (2015) *Russia under Sanctions: Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion*. Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs.
- Stadler, R. (2015) “Genscher fordert Neuanfang mit Putin.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Available at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/interview-genscher-fordert-neuanfang-mit-putin-1.2615763> (Access 7.09.2023).
- Tosiek, P. (2020) „The Prospects for Institutional Reforms of the European Union: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Perspective”, *Srpska Politička Misao*. Vol. 27(68), pp. 141–163. DOI: 10.22182/spm.6822020.6.
- YouGov (2014) *Eurotrack Survey Results*. Available at: [http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus\\_uploads/document/n1z35e9mya/YG-Archive-140327-Ukraine-Eurotrack.pdf](http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/n1z35e9mya/YG-Archive-140327-Ukraine-Eurotrack.pdf) (Access 7.09.2023).
- Zheltovsyy, V. (2020) „European integration processes in post-euromaidan Ukraine: in search for scenarios”, *Online Journal Modelling the New Europe*. No. 32, pp. 72–92. DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2020.32.05.
- Zheltovsyy, V. (2022) “The European Parliament as Transformational Actor toward the Reconsideration of the EU Eastern Policy”, *Politics in Central Europe*. Vol. 18(4), pp. 661–679. DOI: 10.2478/pce-2022-0027.