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European Security Strategies and the War in Ukraine

Abstract

The war in Ukraine made European societies wonder how ready they were for it, and exposed new dangers that European leaders had believed gone. First and foremost, once again, a vision of territorial aggression has returned to the list of threats to European security. Does the EU have adequate security strategies to guideline its response to such dangers? Do the strategies structure the development of instruments so that its institutions and Member States can successfully deal with the threat that the war in Ukraine poses to EU societies?

The EU has two security strategies, from 2003 and 2016, and it stands to reason to verify their adequateness *vis-à-vis* the war in Ukraine. This article studies the provisions of these strategies, presents the progress of the war in Ukraine, and verifies the reactions of EU institutions and Member States in face of these events. While it reflects on the provisions of the security strategies in light of the ways the EU and its Member States have reacted to war, it concludes with a proposal of elements that need adjusting within the EU catalogue of possibilities.

Keywords: European Security Strategy, European Union, Global Strategy, War in Ukraine, European Security

Introduction

Russia's 2022 military intervention in the territory of Ukraine was preceded by months of incidents and an increasing atmosphere of confrontation, thereby threatening European security in a number

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of ways. Relations had been tense ever since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the mutual introduction of economic sanctions in trade between the EU and Russia. The European Union is still, in principle, an advanced economic union, and its authorities try to anticipate political and military threats and strive to prepare to counter them. However, although attempts have been made since the 1950s to build defence policy and enhance military cooperation, the EU today has neither a unified army nor common decision-making protocols for defence. It does have strategies, though, which are a point of reference for its political actions in foreign relations. Are these strategies relevant in responding to the war between Russia and Ukraine, which is taking place just beyond the EU's eastern border? This article studies the provision of the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2016 Global Strategy in view of identifying the relevance of their provisions to its forced response to the war in Ukraine.

European Security Strategy

To date, the European Union has published two security strategies. The first was presented in December 2003, during a time when military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were ongoing.¹ It focused on describing the world and the dangers that seemed contemporary at that time. Summing it up, the authors linked internal security with external security and described the post-Cold War world as being full of opportunities for development. They also warned that by loosening its border regimes, the EU had put itself in a plenitude of dangers. Attention was drawn to the nature of armed conflicts; most of them were not wars in the classic sense, but armed conflicts that destabilise states whose ability to manage their resources and potential was limited as a consequence. The political inadequacy of the state was associated with economy and security, stressing that much violence took place in areas not controlled by state authorities and that poverty fostered conflict. It was pointed out that most victims of military activities were civilians – a trend that had been increasing since the beginning of the twentieth century. Between 1990 and 2002, 18 million people with the status of „displaced persons” or „refugees” were reportedly forced to leave their homes due to armed conflict.

The European Security Strategy also sketched out a worldview, stating that 45 million people died each year from malnutrition;

¹ The text of the *European Security Strategy* can be found at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf> (Access 9.11.2022).

competition for scarce natural resources needed for survival increased and caused aggression. It described AIDS as one of the most devastating pandemics in human history – a disease that not only caused death, but also contributed to the disintegration of societies. Europe's energy dependence on Russia was also noted and cautioned against, being seen as a potential security risk.

What is important when one analyses the relevance of the document for building the EU response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the fact that it was made clear in the 2003 strategy that an attack on the territory of an EU country was unlikely. The more likely threats to the Member States and their societies would be international terrorism, with a particular focus on religious radicalism and/or the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unpredictable consequences could be brought about by an accumulation of different threats. For example, a lack of state control over a territory opened up the possibility of terrorists being trained or the development of weapons of mass destruction being promoted. Among other threats, the authors of the 2003 strategy also highlighted regional conflicts, organised crime, the failure of the state, and the breakdown of power structures.

It was stated in this strategy that none of these threats could be combated by military means alone. The plan for the stabilisation of areas of armed conflict has been set out in some detail; the strategy foresees that military means should be preceded by political measures and that economic support is seen as a guarantee of long-term stability. In addition to military intervention, civilian crisis management should be carried out.

With a view to preventing further threats, the strategy stresses that the classic concept of self-defense in Europe is based on the assumption that territorial integrity is at risk, namely, the threat of invasion. However, the new threats were supposed to be different in nature and were also supposed to require preventive action outside of an integrated Europe. Ideally, the political stability of the EU's neighbours must be strengthened to ensure the Union's security. Attention was drawn to the need to promote stability processes in the countries to the east of the Union and around the Mediterranean.

The 2003 strategy highlighted the role of multilateral diplomacy and the activities of EU countries in international organisations. The spirit and message of the document are probably best described in the following quotation: "The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed, democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law, and protecting human rights are the best

means of strengthening the international order” (Council of the European Union, 2009). Thus, the authors of the document linked European security with a democratic, predictable, well-governed surrounding, but also suggested that diplomacy and development assistance are one of the strongest instruments the EU has.

The strategy recommended steps that the Union should take to increase its defense capability; reference was made to the need to involve the Member States more closely in its strategic objectives and in the development of security policy. The strategy also recommended improving coherence between the Union’s institutions and instruments, along with a better co-ordination of internal actions. The need to build capacity for rapid response, including preventive measures, was also highlighted. It is important to develop the European Defence Agency (EDA), as it has been entrusted with the research and development of solutions for the Union’s economies and to strengthen Europe’s defence sector.

It is quite clear from the document that the Union should rely on bilateral cooperation, base its security on cooperation with NATO, strengthen the coordination of its armies, and, in particular, its civilian resources in the management of armed conflicts beyond its borders. It should also strengthen its defence capacity by encouraging its Member States to synchronise their reactions in the international arena by building harmony between its own programs and institutions. It does not, however, include physical threats to its territory to the list of dangers and, while mentioning the destabilisation of states and regions, it presents a list of derivate problems such as the rise of terrorist groups, biological-weapon construction, and human trafficking while it seems that the war in Ukraine presents an entirely new set of problems not perceived in the strategy.

In essence, the model that is recommended in the 2003 strategy excludes the danger of territorial invasion, and concentrates on soft and smart power that is supposed to be used preventively mainly in the EU’s neighbourhood aiming to support the political stabilisation of surrounding states. Not only strong or stable governments are expected to prevent conflicts but, by controlling their territories, they would also make sure no threats – the sources of which are connected to terrorist activities – could grow. The strategy also suggests an institutional strengthening of the Union in preparation for the necessity to react to any dangers. This model has unfortunately yet naturally been verified by 2022’s Russian invasion of Ukraine. The authors of the strategy thought unreal the danger of territorial aggression and recommend the EU authorities invest in relations with their neighbours. Ukraine

is one such neighbour and, therefore, the support given to it in the face of invasion is completely in line with those recommendations. One question remains, however, of whether dismissing the thought of territorial aggression as being unlikely, and concentrating defense efforts mainly on the dangers associated with military conflicts outside of the EU would still be justified today.

EU Global Strategy

The Union's Global Strategy was adopted in mid-2016, i.e., close to 13 years after the first strategy, about two years after the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, and not much before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.² How was the EU's Global Strategy helpful in guiding the EU and its Member States in reacting to this intervention?

The Global Strategy was a retake on Europe's view of threats and started off by saying that the world had changed over the last decade not only in the bringing about of new opportunities, but also of new threats. In this document, more emphasis has been placed on the fact that many areas around the EU were politically and economically destabilised, particularly in Africa and Asia. The problems with non-renewable natural resources were greater, and the context of climate change played an increasing, if not dominant role in security. Relationships in the world were described as more complex and interconnected, with rivalry being the overarching element.

In 2016, the balance of power between the world forces changed as compared to 2003. While developing the new security strategy, it was stressed that the era of traditional multilateralism is likely to come to an end, and that one of the accompanying effects is the emergence of situations in which no strong state would have an interest in stabilising a conflict. This leads to an increase of weak states and so-called "ungoverned spaces". This term, describing territories not subject to an effective form of legitimate state authority, was included in EU parlance for the first time.

The recommendations of the authors of the Global Strategy focused in particular on influencing armed conflicts on the margins of the Union and supporting partners in strategic areas for the EU's security, including the Western Balkans, Turkey, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

² The 2016 security strategy can be found here: *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*. Available at: https://www.eas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf (Access 14.11.2022).

With regard to Africa, the Strategy's authors recommended focusing on migration policy and trade agreements. Cooperation within NATO and with the United Nations should continue to be the EU's security axis.

The authors of the Global Strategy stressed that the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) had lost its momentum, and that work to strengthen security instruments had been slow. In 2016, in the CSDP, there was still a lack of uniform decision-making, synchronisation of security and defence policies between the Member States, along with a lack of any harmonisation of funding channels and expenditure procedures. In the new document, it was suggested that the so-called "comprehensive approach" to conflicts and crises should be the general framework delivering guidelines on the use of EU instruments in the CSDP. This should create much-needed synergies between the different programs and instruments within the EU structures. More strongly than in the 2003 Strategy, it was emphasised that gaps in policies, measures, and procedures had led to a weakening of the Union's position, which the EU cannot afford in a dynamically changing, international environment.

While the authors of this second security strategy clearly acknowledge the rising temperature of the relations between states in international relations *and* point out dangers coming from the increasing political destabilisation of areas, they do not clearly recognise the threat of territorial aggression against the EU nor the dangers of such an invasion in its close neighbourhood. Moreover, it does not mention Ukraine as a potential geographic direction of threats, nor does it state the role of Russia in its security strategy.

An Evaluation of EU Security Strategies

At the time of its publication, the 2003 European Security Strategy was perceived first and foremost as a set of points of reference regarding the internal organisation of the EU's programs, institutions, and initiatives into fundamentals for its comprehensive approach. It touched upon several areas of interaction in the international arena ranging from trade to defense, but kept military conflict as the primary source of threats (Biscop, 2005). Nonetheless, some analysts point out the inconsistency of the provisions of the document (Toje, 2005). It has been described by a large number of commentators as a "toothless tiger".³ It was particularly disappointing because, in light of the events in the world that accompanied

³ An ample selection of comments on the European Security Strategy expressed in the international press was summed up in 2003 by Sołtyk (2003).

its formulation (i.e., the international operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq), there were clear guidelines and a tougher stance was expected. The text had been considerably watered down in comparison to the first drafts, and, in its final version, it was utterly lacking in statements on the use of force. The document was also bereft of provisions on the deployment of European forces, nor did it in any way oblige Member States to take any military action.

The authors of the first strategy were accused of failing to refer to the ongoing war in Chechnya in order to avoid defining the EU's position at that time. Supposedly, such a reflection would ultimately require forming a strategy towards Russia which at the time (and to this day) was lacking in the EU. In 2003, the EU was unwilling to deal with Russian power, although it was clear that European security could not be built without sorting out the EU's relationship with Russia.

Still in 2016, while publishing the Global Strategy, the issue of Russia's role in the European security architecture had not been addressed. In 2016, Howorth and Schmidt stressed that Russia had been "an essential actor in the European system – one which can neither be integrated nor (equally importantly) ignored" (Howorth, Schmidt, 2016, p. 107). The authors warned that "the EU's Russia policy should involve, first and foremost, a lucid assessment of the cards the EU holds. The EU has been playing identity politics in Ukraine, while Putin has been playing Thucydides. Europe possesses many resources – technological, financial, commercial, scientific, demographic, and political that vastly outweigh those of Russia. These should be deployed more strategically – which means more collectively" (Howorth, Schmidt, 2016, pp. 107–108). They invoked Russia's tough, realistic policy, which consistently, even shamelessly, exploited its advantages and leverages. In their 2016 publication, Howorth and Schmidt, state that it would be crucial to decide on the future of the EU's enlargement to include Ukraine and formulate a strategy towards Russia including the European future of Ukraine. They support the view that the EU firstly needs to clarify how the Union's interests relate to those of Russia, and then to assess how far Brussels can go if these interests collide. There has never been an official balance sheet in the EU made known in that regard. Only a few years later, in 2022, the EU was no longer confronted with the need to define its strategy, but with the need to act without delay, despite the fact that there was no extant security strategy.

Le Gloanec continues the criticism of the policies of the European Union and wrote in 2016 that the military actions of Russia in Ukraine, the representation of the war in Syria, the violation of the airspace of NATO

states, the infiltration of Russia into the Union through the development of Gazprom activities, disinformation, the refugee crisis and the spread of ISIS into Libya, Mali, and even Europe are largely a consequence of the EU's policies or lack thereof (Le Gloannec, 2016). The author criticises the EU for failing to respond effectively to the Russian embargo on Ukrainian products introduced in 2013, and for failing to ensure effective decision-making. Europe needs a comprehensive security system, because for now, the cooperation of EU states is just this – a cooperation of some, then a few more, and then twenty-odd states committed to maintaining peace. As Le Gloannec writes: “The European Union established itself as a small community which forged a new way of conducting international relations in Europe. It gradually – and sometimes haphazardly and reluctantly – expanded its model and eventually began to dominate the continent and influence its periphery” (Le Gloannec, 2016, p. 103). The author suggests that the occurrence of new dangers – including those mentioned above, proves that a similar model is no longer valid today. It follows that the Union must rethink not only the instruments but also the foundations of its security policy.

Many commentators refer to the bases of the security policy as presented in both strategies (Youngs, 2016; Kratochvíl, 2016; Witney, 2016; Stelzenmüller, 2016; Schwarzer, 2016; Tanaka, 2016). They recognise the discrepancy between the soft instruments that the EU has and the description of a world threatened by actions over which these instruments have little impact. They refer to the clash between the liberal order in which the EU was founded and the realism that dominates the policies of the most aggressive and active international players. Witney writes: “The dramatic global power shifts of the last decade have punctured Europeans’ preferred view of themselves as an ascendant soft-superpower” (Witney, 2016, p. 43). While the Global Strategy emphasises the growing interconnectedness and interdependence of global processes, which is in line with the spirit of liberalism, it also notes a particularly intensive use of realpolitik instruments. There are more authoritarian states in the world than in 2003, and more activities that influence events caused by elements outside the international system, often against international law. Leigh believes that “the ‘return of realpolitik’ does not condemn Europe to impotence”, and stresses that the EU's strength lies in areas where decisions are taken at the supranational level or where states act coherently (Leigh, 2016). One of the outcomes of this is a recommendation to consolidate decision-making processes in areas where the security of Europeans is to be ensured.

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine

On 24th February 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine from both an already-Russian-controlled Crimea and from Belarus.⁴ The aim, it seemed, was to seize power and replace the government with Kremlin-controlled politicians. The invasion was significantly slowed down by well-organised Ukrainian defense forces, and the fact that Kiev was unoccupied. The Western countries reacted immediately and harshly; in addition to condemning Russia, the USA incapacitated the operation of Russian banks and blocked the export of sensitive technologies. The European Union blocked Russian banks in the SWIFT system, which makes it almost impossible to trade internationally, and froze the deposits of the Russian Central Bank. Shell, BP, and Norway unilaterally withdrew from joint ventures with Russian companies.

On 28th February, Ukraine applied for EU membership, and, a few days later, Russia shelled Ukraine's largest nuclear power plant, causing great concern in Europe about a potential disaster similar to that of Chernobyl. The EU announced a plan to reduce the independence of Russian energy resources from REPowerEU, and the United States banned the import of Russian oil. While the US Congress approved USD 13.6 billion in support for Ukraine, the Versailles Declaration was signed in the Union, mobilising Member States to increase defence spending. NATO estimates that in the first month of the fighting, Russia lost between 7,000 and 15,000 soldiers, with another 40,000 either wounded, captured or missing.

The second phase of the war appeared to start a month after the beginning of the invasion, when it was clear that the invaders had failed to seize power in a blitzkrieg. Russia focused on the East and defended itself against the counter-offensive of the Ukrainian army, which was supported by supplies of weapons, ammunition, and missile systems from the West. Initial negotiations between the Russian and Ukrainian authorities began, but those talks did not lead to a peaceful solution. The number of refugees (including, naturally, refugees from contested areas) reached many millions, and Russia's actions led to an increasing number of civilian deaths.

The EU banned the import of Russian coal, thereby depriving the Russian government of the influence of approximately USD 7.97 billion

⁴ The events in this section are introduced as presented by AlJazeera. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/24/timeline-six-months-of-russias-war-in-ukraine> (Access 22.08.2022); Euronews. Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/30/ukraine-war-a-month-by-month-timeline-of-the-conflict-in-2022> (Access 22.08.2022); CNN. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2023/02/europe/russia-ukraine-war-timeline/index.html> (Access 14.03.2023).

in revenue per year. The sanctions also affected the import of Russian timber, cement, fertilisers, seafood, and the export of sensitive technologies and software to Russia. The EU Accession Questionnaire was then sent to Ukraine, which is the first step in the enlargement process. Although Russia went on to try to resume its offensive in western Ukraine, it was successfully blocked. The USA took further measures and ran assistance programmes, and the EU entered a sixth phase of sanctions against Russia by completely banning the import of Russian oil from the end of 2022.

On 18th May of the same year, Finland announced its intention to join NATO, followed three days later by Sweden. In this case, their NATO membership will mean the end of a two-hundred-year-long neutrality. On 29th June, NATO officially invited the two states to join, but with Turkey's veto still on the way.

In mid-June, Russia limited its gas supplies to the European Union to 40% and, on 24th June, the European Union invited Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to apply for EU membership. For the first time since the Revolution of 1917, Russia did not pay the instalment of its national debt – totalling \$100 million. The NATO Secretary General revealed that the Response Force (NFR) had been increased from 30,000 to 400,000.

Although the third phase of the war began with the Lugano Peace Conference, in which 40 states participated, Russia extended its objectives to the Kherson Oblast and Zaporozhye. The Ukrainian troops had destroyed many Russian arsenals and defeated numerous armies, but the fighting was still fierce, claiming many civilian deaths and leading to the complete destruction of settlement infrastructure.

July 2022 seemed to be a crucial month for opening up channels of communication. Firstly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia had moved away from its goal of occupying the two eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, and that Kherson and Zaporozhye were equally important to Russia. Zaporozhye, incidentally, is where the nuclear power plant is placed. Two days later, an agreement negotiated by the United Nations was signed, which included Russia's consent to the export of Ukrainian grain by the Russian fleet. Four days later, Gazprom announced that it would limit gas supplies to EU countries to 20% of the original volume, and the EU authorities voluntarily declared a further reduction to 15% between August and March 2023.

Despite the progress made in communication, both sides fought fiercely; Ukraine destroyed equipment, ammunition, and the army of the enemy, and Russia also attacked the civilian population.

By August 24th, six months since the beginning of the war had passed.

Actions by the Union and its Member States in Support of Ukraine in the War Against Russia

The European Union has taken two measures to support Ukraine; the provision of direct aid to Ukraine and its citizens, and sanctions against Russia. The first category includes political support, humanitarian and financial aid, along with military aid in the form of equipment supplies.⁵ By September, the EU had committed EUR 5.4 billion to support the Ukrainian economy, and EUR 2.5 billion had been made available under the European Peace Facility to compensate contributing Member States for expenditure as regards the provision of military equipment sent to Ukraine.

Already on 9th April, under the auspices of the European Union, the global fundraising campaign “Stand Up for Ukraine” announced measures to support Ukrainian refugees. A total of EUR 9 billion had been raised, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development pledged an additional EUR 1 billion to meet the needs of war refugees. Macro-financial assistance aims to support Ukraine’s economy and finances so as to enable the government to exercise its power and cover the basic costs necessary for the functioning of the state. The EU has provided a further EUR 348 million in humanitarian aid, EUR 332 million for projects to ensure access to essential goods and services such as food, education, and health, and EUR 220 million to support refugees outside Ukraine. 30 countries, comprising 27 EU Member States, along with Norway, Turkey, and Northern Macedonia – have joined the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (rescUE), which coordinates Ukraine’s supply of food, medicines, along with building materials and strategic equipment including fire trucks, fire extinguishers, power generators, ambulances, and mobile hospitals. As most refugees cross the borders of the European Union in Poland, Poland received support from other EU Member States (France, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Spain) and Norway. Since its beginning, rescUE has been significantly expanded to strengthen its response capacity to different types of disasters. RescUE is setting up a reserve of resources to include both rescue equipment (helicopters and fire-fighting aircraft) and medical supplies.

⁵ The information on the EU assistance for Ukraine in this section comes from the website of the European Commission: https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine_en (Access 25.08.2022).

Perhaps the most advantageous element was the adoption, on 4th March, of the directive on the temporary protection of people fleeing the war in Ukraine. It allows those who meet the relevant criteria to stay in the EU for at least one year, obtain a residence permit, access to education, the labour market, housing, and social and medical assistance.

In addition, the EU supports Ukraine in selling grain, which is one of the main sources of its income, and supports its energy sector by making available its gas purchasing system. Ukraine's electricity grid has also been adapted to the EU grid. In order to support Ukrainian exports, the European Commission has proposed suspending import duties on Ukrainian goods and anti-dumping and safeguard measures against Ukrainian steel exports for one year. In addition, the Commission invited mobile operators to continue to suspend or significantly reduce international roaming costs for Ukrainian operators' numbers. The European Commission supports the government of Ukraine through the preparing of a reconstruction plan and coordinates most of the state's international grants and loans.

In 2014, shortly after Russia's conquest of Crimea, the EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia for the first time. At the time of writing, sanctions are directed against the state, its companies, and prominent persons. Bank sanctions by the EU, the United States, and the United Kingdom have restricted the Russian authorities' access to their foreign financial reserves, while the exclusion of many Russian banks from the international payment system SWIFT has significantly slowed down the transfer of income for energy resources exported by Russia. The sanctions have also affected imports of Russian gas and oil; the US has banned them completely, while Germany has frozen a pipeline project from Russia, and the EU, which still depends for about 40% on Russian gas, has announced import restrictions and declared that it has ceased all imports of Russian coal. Sanctions were also imposed on oligarchs and influential figures of the Russian government; their luxury goods on the territory of EU countries have been confiscated, their funds frozen, and the United Kingdom stopped issuing visas to wealthy Russians (i.e., so-called "golden visas"). The sale of dual-use goods, namely, civil and military industrial goods (e.g., car parts) to Russia, the use of EU, US, and UK airspace by Russian airlines, and the buying of Russian gold have all been banned. Luxury goods are also not allowed to be sold to Russia, and the United Kingdom has levied an additional duty of 35% on certain goods from Russia, such as vodka. Some multinational or even global corporations have ceased operations in Russia or even withdrawn from Russia entirely. These include Coca-Cola, McDonalds, Starbucks, and Marks & Spencer (BBC, 2022).

Russia has responded to international sanctions in a similar way; it has also imposed restrictions on the export of its goods important to Western markets, blocked interest payments to foreign investors, and prevented them from selling their assets (BBC, 2022).

It is difficult to determine the impact of the sanctions imposed by both parties on the Russian market. On one hand, observers report that there is no shortage of goods in stores, and it is assumed that Russia has had time to adjust its market, as many sanctions have been in place since 2014. On the other hand, changes in the structure of Russia's exports of energy commodities will require massive adjustments in the medium and long term if Russia continues to view them as one of its main sources of income. There is also the threat of economic recession that cannot be covered by financial reserves.

Conclusions

Looking at the consistency of the actions of the EU and its Member States with the provisions of the aforementioned security strategies, it becomes clear that at least two things have occurred, the first of which is a outpouring of support for a democratic state in the EU's close neighbourhood with regard to territorial defence, along with the Union supporting Ukraine both financially and politically and condemning Russia. Secondly, it backed Ukraine with arms deliveries, thus promoting the development of security operations outside its borders, which is what both strategies recommend. No Member State has decided to deploy its forces on Ukrainian territory, but neither the EU nor international law would oblige or allow such interventions as Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and the UN Security Council resolution that could sanction a deployment of that kind depends on the unanimity of its permanent members, including Russia. A resolution of this kind is, therefore, not possible. In these circumstances, the financial, political, and arms-supply responses are probably the strongest that could have been made, though better timing and coordination could have strengthened the effectiveness of this assistance. In addition, the EU – and in particular Ukraine's neighbouring states – absorbed the wave of refugees which is again a clear signal which reflects the EU's migration policy.

Looking at the provisions of EU security strategies along with the events in Ukraine and the EU's responses to them, five major conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the Union's security strategies do not recognise the risk of breaching the territorial integrity of its Member States and do not list territorial aggression as one of the threats. Instead, they concentrate on

recommending interventions into armed conflicts outside of the EU borders and supporting states which are dealing with unstable systems of governance. While they point to the need to consolidate decision-making procedures and increase efficiency in the security sector, the recommendations aim to prepare European armies for deployment abroad. So is the Union prepared to face an invasion if Russia's policy should result in the EU's borders being violated? In recent years, armed actions have taken place in the Union's neighbourhood, namely, in Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Greminger, 2021). Despite the declared readiness of EU armies to operate outside the borders, these troops have not been deployed in Ukraine for political reasons. While the legal aspect is crucial here, it is also due to the continued dependence of the EU and its Member States on the supply of Russian energy raw materials. Even as far back as 2003, the European Security Strategy warned against such a situation.

The second observation concerns EU countries' energy dependence on Russia. The sudden need to become independent of Russian oil and gas betrays the disagreement between the EU Member States, which also explains why there is still no common energy policy. The interests of the states are different. In the name of maintaining independence, the states' determination not to set up a common energy policy will likely lead to price rises in imported energy materials, with economic unrest and maybe even social unrest being distinct possibilities as a result. The expected multiple price increases for energy raw materials could have been avoided or spread over a longer period of time and thus more easily absorbed by economies if the shift away from Russian raw materials had been gradual and managed. This was already indicated in the 2003 Strategy. Alternatively, energy dependence on Russia could have been neutralised by an advanced diversification of origins as regards raw materials used in the EU, or by switching economies to alternative energy sources.

The third conclusion relates to military cooperation between the Member States; since risks and security measures need to be re-examined, it will be necessary to change the way States cooperate in setting up a joint defense – from armies to joint procurement and the reorganisation of development projects. These directions are consistently highlighted by the EDA that emphasises the potential for economisation, which is reflected not only in financial savings, but also in increased readiness for joint action in these areas.⁶

⁶ See also: HR/VP Josep Borrell's remarks on the situation in Ukraine and the EU Sanctions against Russia during the European Parliament Plenary session, 06.04.2022. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/hrvp-josep-borrell-ep-plenary-session-06042022-situation-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia_en (Access 20.08.2022).

Fourthly, security strategies are developed without tactics toward Russia. Many experts point out that the Union's policy is inconsistent; the EU launches programmes and projects involving Russia's satellite states, implements a neighbourhood policy, and competes with Russia in the area of the Eastern Partnership (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan), yet it has no strategy towards Russia, nor has it even described their positions, relations, or importance. Ultimately, the differences between the Member States mean that there is no policy, or even no strategy with regard to Russia.

Finally, the Union needs much greater coordination not only of its instruments, procedures, and funding channels, but also of its policies. In defining a strategy towards Russia or preparing for an invasion of Ukraine, the Union seems to be forced to review all its policies and to determine its role in shaping Eastern and security policy. Only the Union's trade policy, the oldest of the EU institutions, transfers the bulk of power to EU institutions. The other areas of cooperation – most of them formalised with the transformation of the European Communities into the Union in 1992 – are developed and implemented on the basis of decision-making procedures in which responsibilities are divided differently between the common institutions and the Member States which most often express the wish to retain control over any decisions made. This is deadly for policy implementation, as it severely restricts decision-making. CSPD is a policy in which the Member States wish to preserve their sovereignty, and this paradoxically limits the defense capabilities of states which do not benefit from the economies of scale that could be achieved by adopting a common approach.

The second key element in relation to a better coordination of policies is the energy sector. Already in the first security strategy, energy dependence was identified as a threat to the independence of the Union, and leaders were warned against subjecting the policies and economies of the Member States to Russian supplies. The reactions of EU Member States to the increasingly alarming news of the events in Ukraine were mixed, and moderated by the coverage of the supply of energy raw materials from Russia. This shows that the energy policy of the future can be precisely the element that transforms the EU from a so-called "soft superpower" into a player with the tools to realise real policy in international relations. These could be teeth the EU is accused of lacking. Coordination between countries in the field of migration policy, effective responses to migration crises, and trade policy, which still seems to be one of the Union's strongest instruments, should be added and become one of those missing teeth. All these policies, brought together in a single, coherent framework for

cooperation, would have an impact on the international strength of the Union and its Member States.

The security strategy itself also needs to be redefined. Member States should learn a lesson of cooperation within the EU institutions, particularly in the field of security; working together is undoubtedly more effective. If they defend their control over the decision-making process, they are counterproductive by undermining their capacity and that of the Union, prolonging decision-making and limiting their ability to act. Institutional and political changes are necessary: “The war in Ukraine exposed the EU’s weaknesses: inflexibility, a lack of unanimity and a weak security policy. (...) In the past, these dysfunctions paralysed the EU in the face of such crises and conflicts as in Libya, the Sahel, and the Middle East” (Pirozzi, 2022). Not only is it the procedure, but it is also the way in which the Member States apply it that require review. In the field of foreign and security policy, where decisions are, in principle, taken unanimously, the procedure of “constructive abstention” or “enhanced cooperation” may be used (Pirozzi, 2022). The first procedure allows a Member State to abstain from voting without blocking the decision-making process. The second procedure allows at least nine EU Member States to engage in enhanced cooperation in a given area if the EU as a whole is unable to do so within a reasonable period. Both allow for a faster integration path between members, a speedier decision-making process, or a more stringent response by at least some if not all Member States want to commit to it. Member States have chosen not to use any of these procedures in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian invasion confronted the EU both with the inadequacy of its *acquis communautaire* and its capacity to act. Moreover, it shook the prospect of predictable sources of danger for European states. This forecast of threats (listed in both security strategies) remained unchallenged even in the face of the growing confrontation with Russia. It was only the ongoing war that forced the EU and its Member States into a dialogue with Ukraine on EU membership, and it prompted Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership and abandon their neutral status, and also prompted Denmark to give up its opt-out from the Union’s security area (as expressed in a referendum in June 2022). Now, and more quickly than ever before, the EU needs to secure independence from Russian energy resources, which will not only change the direction of world trade, but will also hasten the development of alternative energy sources. Rising food prices will force governments to change their agricultural policies. These are probably the biggest processes that will affect Europe.

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