Paula Marcinkowska★

Peacekeeping in the Mediterranean as an Ongoing Challenge for International Organizations: the EU Case[1]

The number of peace operations has significantly grown in the last few decades. This results not only from the growing violence in national and international conflicts, but also from the increased role of regional organizations in implementing the multilateral security concept.[2] Peace operations are associated with both ensuring peace and competition for leadership on the global political scene. Some regions, due to their tense nature, are of special interest to external actors in building their position on the regional and world stage. The Mediterranean is a test for multilateralism in dealing with security matters, in particular when we observe the increasing ambition of regional actors to play the role of a peace guardian in the region.

Analysis of the Mediterranean region is a complex issue. Geographically, this area includes various subregions: Southern Europe (most of which consists of members of the European Union, and Turkey as a candidate country), Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) and Mashreq (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority). This paper examines peacekeeping in the Mediterranean understood as a region of non-European countries belonging to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), formerly known as the Barcelona Process (now part of the European Neighbourhood Policy), covering North Africa and the Middle East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority. The aim of this article is to analyze the significance of multilateral cooperation

★ **Paula Marcinkowska**, Ph.D – Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, p.marcinkowska@uw.edu.pl.

[1] Topic inspired by the conference paper on peacekeeping in the Mediterranean presented by the author at the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations (EISA), 18-21 September 2013, Warsaw.

[2] F. Attina, *Global power competition and the rise of minilateralism in peace operations* in:*Multilateral security and ESDP operations*, eds. F. Attina, D. Irrera, Ashgate, Fornham/ Burlington 2010, p. 23.

in response to security challenges in the Mediterranean, in terms of peace operations in the region, with a special emphasis on the EU's involvement in ensuring peace and stability in the region. The analysis takes into account different types of conflicts:

- "internationalized internal conflicts" between government and non-governmental movements/opposition, when one or both sides of the conflict get military support from other state(s);
- "internal conflicts" between a government side on the one hand and a non-governmental party on the other, but without participation of external actors.

The increasing number of internal (armed) conflicts, as well as the lack of progress in settlement of internationalized internal conflicts, contributes to the growing number of peace operations providing a mandate for multilateral cooperation in ensuring peace and security in the region.[3]

In post-Cold War times, the term "peacekeeping" itself is no longer based only on the military dimension of action, but has been extended to other dimensions of security, such as humanitarian assistance, post-conflict development and counter-terrorism actions. In times when all aspects of security overlap, peace operations are becoming more comprehensive. This requires a clear vision of international actors' activities, which is often one of the main problems in achieving effectiveness of their operations. The multidimensionality of today's peacekeeping operations creates a space for engagement of the EU in the region as a soft power and fulfilment of its ambition to play a significant role in global security governance.

Multilateral Cooperation in Security Matters

The end of the Cold War directly contributed to changes in the UN's agenda for securing peace and stability on the international scene. In 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali prepared the report "An Agenda for Peace",[4] which described the UN's ambitions to play the main role in the new, fast-changing political reality. The report outlined the roles in ensuring peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding. This meant expansion of the UN's tasks in protecting the world order.[5]

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[3] Based on the typology of armed conflicts presented in: ibidem, p. 27.

[4] *An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, Report of the UN Secretary-General, A/47/277-S/24111 17 June 1992.

[5] M.W. Doyle, *Discovering the limits and potential of peacekeeping*, in: *Peacemaking and peacekeeping for the new century*, eds. O.A. Otunnu, M.W. Doyle, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham/New York/Boulder/Oxford 1998, pp. 2–7.

With the end of the Cold War, there has also been an essential change in the perception of international security. Global power does not belong only to military capabilities, but also soft power and states' economic potential. Moreover, it was found that international security could not be ensured by one actor alone – neither the United Nations nor any single state. The emerging process of regionalization contributed to the increase of regional organizations' ambitions in their external policies. They have aspired to play an important role in ensuring regional security. Thereby they have succeeded in filling a gap in the international security system by offering new tools and mechanisms that the UN could not demonstrate: geographic proximity and a deep knowledge of the region.[6]

The UN remains the main international organization to take multilateral actions. However, the wide range of threats and challenges emerging from different parts of the world make it impossible for the UN to deal with them effectively. Regarding the Mediterranean region, other international institutions, such as the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Arab League, need to play an important role in making multilateral security cooperation effective.

The United Nations and Regional Organizations – the Case of the EU

The relations between the United Nations and regional organizations are governed by the UN Charter, Chapter VIII: "Regional Arrangements." Article 52 suggests that local conflicts should be dealt with firstly through regional arrangements, "either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council".[7] It is argued that the scope of the relationship between two (or more) international organizations should not be based only on the UN Charter provisions but also on their different levels of cooperation and interaction (political, legal, operational etc.).[8] This is because countries prefer soft institutionalization to make their cooperation more pragmatic.[9] The most recent UN Security Council

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[6] T. Tardy, *Building peace in post-conflict environments. Why and how the UN and the EU interact*, in: *The EU, the UN and collective security. Making multilateralism effective*, eds. J. Krause, N. Ronzitti, Routledge, London & New York 2012, p. 198.

[7] *Charter of the United Nations*, signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, document available on the UN website: http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html (access 5.11.2016).

[8] T. Tardy, op.cit., p. 199.

[9] N. Graeger, A. Novosseloff, *The role of the OSCE and the EU*, in: *The United Nations & Regional Security. Europe and Beyond*, eds. M. Pugh, W.P. Singh Sidhu, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London 2003, p. 77.

Resolution 2167 (2014) on regional organizations and peacekeeping reaffirms that collective security could be improved by cooperation between the UN and appropriate regional organizations. The document confirms the need for strengthening the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping actions.[10]

Among the most advanced cooperation between the UN and a regional organization is the cooperation with the European Union. Both organizations call themselves "key partners," and they cooperate on various types of issues (development, democracy, humanitarian aid, conflict resolution). The cooperation was enhanced after the Saint-Malo summit in 1998 and the meeting of the European Council in Cologne (1999), which finalized the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, known since the Lisbon Treaty as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The cooperation was confirmed in the Joint Declaration on UN–EU Cooperation in Crisis Management (4 September 2003) after the EU's first operation ("Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of Congo).[11] However, UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping is visible only in the Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is mostly "UN-driven" because the primary responsibility for authorizing the use of force belongs to the UN Security Council (according to Article 53 of the UN Charter, "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council").[12] Peacebuilding operations require both operational and financial capacities, due to their complex nature resulting from more challenges than any single institution could deal with. Therefore, cooperation between at least two organizations, even when some difficulties arise, seems to be inevitable for effective peacebuilding. The UN depends on the EU's resources, and for the EU, supporting the UN in peace operations strengthens its position both within the United Nations system and in the region. However, the diverse nature of both actors influences their security cooperation. Difficulties in interorganizational cooperation include different preferences of the member states and capability gaps. The EU presents itself as a neutral peacebuilding actor, but its operations are directly linked to member states' national interests, and thus domestic policies of the EU members

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[10] *UN Security Council Resolution 2167 (2014) on regional organizations and peacekeeping*, available: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8-CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2167.pdf (access 5.11.2016).

[11] A. Novosseloff, *United Nations – European Union. Cooperation in the field of peacekeeping. Challenges and prospects*, GGI Analysis Paper No. 4/2012, The Global Governance Institute, Brussels, June 2012, pp. 6–8.

[12] Charter of the United Nations, op.cit.

play a crucial role in the EU's external operations.[13] The European Union does not build its own army, but its collective military capacity is based on the will of each member state to participate in a particular operation due to its national interests.[14] It is always a matter of choice for each member state whether to contribute to an EU mission or one organized by the UN or NATO. With the lack of a unified vision of the EU's military role in the international area, EU member states, due to their different national interests, are not eager to increase resources for the CSDP.[15] These national disagreements present an obstacle to development of a coherent vision of this policy.

The Mediterranean Region

The Mediterranean Sea has been of geostrategic importance for various international actors. It is also an extremely diverse region with various political systems and economic, cultural and demographic differences. Imbalance directly contributes to escalation of national as well as international disputes and conflicts in the region. This puzzle makes it difficult but at the same time necessary to create an effective security framework for international cooperation.

The geographical proximity of the Mediterranean affects the foreign policy of the European Union (and its member states) towards this region and creates a necessity for dialogue and cooperation. The Mediterranean's extreme diversity makes this very difficult to implement. The barriers that exist between different parts of the region restrain the establishment of a united system of international cooperation. Any attempts by European countries to ensure a secure neighbourhood are often considered by Southern Mediterranean countries as an attempt to impose Western values and interfere with their internal affairs.[16] However, the main obstacle to effective multilateral cooperation in the region is the lack of a common identity. The new challenges arising from migration, armaments, terrorism and organized crime are transnational, which only makes the region more unstable.

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[13] T. Tardy, op.cit., pp. 204–211.

[14] N. Graeger, A. Novosseloff, op.cit., p. 85.

[15] N.F. Sola, *Reasons for the current failure of the European Union as an International Security Actor*, in: *Global Power Europe – vol. 1. Theoretical and Institutional Approaches to the EU's External Relations*, Springer, Heidelberg 2013, p. 87.

[16] S. Blank, *The Mediterranean and Its Security Agenda*, "Mediterranean Quarterly", Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 30–31.

The EU's Foreign and Security Policy Tools towards the Mediterranean

The EU's capability to act on the international stage has been changing since the beginning of the 1990s when the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the European Security and Defence Policy, was created. The EU's commitment to building its capabilities in peace operations was increased in 1999 at the European Council meeting in Helsinki. Since 2003, the EU has led crisis management operations within its security and defence policy framework. In the Lisbon Treaty the scope of the Common Security and Defence Policy was extended *inter alia* to post-conflict stabilization. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the assistance of the European External Action Service, is to help the EU in achieving its foreign and security policy goals. The increased role of supranational institutions as well as a commitment to multilateralism is about strengthening the EU's position in international relations.[17]

Before 1995, the EU did not seek any common position on non-European Mediterranean countries. The reason lay in the different expectations and interests among European states towards this region. From a historical and geographical point of view, those most interested in cooperation with North Africa and the Middle East were Southern European countries. However, EU countries were mainly involved in trade relations (even the Euro-Arab Dialogue inaugurated in 1974[18] was based on trade agreements). The accession of Spain and Portugal to European structures gradually changed the EU's perception of the Southern Mediterranean. The breakthrough in mutual relations came in 1995 with the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, known as the Barcelona Process. This created the foundation of a new type of EU relations with this region, based on "partnership." It was the beginning of building a new dialogue structure between the European Union on one side and North Africa and the Middle East on the other (one of the "baskets" concerns political and security issues in the region). Common challenges were supposed to be dealt with on a common multilateral ground. This was strictly linked to EU concerns regarding the instability in the region.[19]

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[17] F. Arcidiacono, *EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya: Testing EU Actorness*, "ReShape Online Papers Series", Paper no. 03/13, Jean Monnet Centre, Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Catania, Italy, p. 2.

[18] More: S. Dosenrode, A. Stubkjaer, *The European Union and the Middle East*, London, New York 2002.

[19] P. Marcinkowska, *Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa. Unia Europejska i jej sąsiedzi – wzajemne relacje i* wyzwania, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2011, pp. 154–159.

The European Union sees challenges emerging from the Southern Mediterranean region more as political, economic and social threats than military ones. For many years, the EU member states could not agree on the EU's priorities towards this region. The European Security Strategy (ESS) formulated in 2003[20] finally indentified the main challenges to the EU's priorities. Regional conflicts are named among the key threats, and strengthening the UN in ensuring peace is one of the Union's most important tasks. At the same time, there was no illusion that the European Union is a military power; therefore, the ESS stresses that all threats should be tackled by "effective multilateralism," especially by cooperating with the UN.[21] The Report on the Implementation of the ESS[22] from 2008 reaffirms this position[23].

Just before the biggest EU enlargement, the European Union needed to adapt to challenges resulting from new neighbouring countries, especially when it was seen that the Barcelona Process had failed to meet its aims. Under the influence of the European Security Strategy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU proposed a new type of cooperation with its neighbours: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),[24] which is not directly linked to the EU's actions towards conflict settlement but is aimed at contributing to the promotion of peace and security in the neighbourhood. The EU created a mechanism of cooperation founded not only on a multilateral framework but also on a bilateral basis. The new "Union for the Mediterranean," created in 2008[25] as the southern dimension of the ENP, has however not proved to be an effective instrument in dealing with challenges emerging from the southern EU border. It is argued that improvement in relations within the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue depends on the progress in establishing peace in the region,

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[20] *A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy*, Brussels 12.12.2003, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/r00004_en.htm (access 26.10. 2016).

[21] F. Cameron, *An introduction to European Foreign Policy. Second edition*, Routledge, London/New York 2012, p. 9.

[22] *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World*, S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008, available: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf (access 5.11.2016).

[23] An additional EU security strategy was released two years later – *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*, COM(2010) 673 final, Brussels, 22.11.2010; as well as in 2015 – *The European Agenda on Security*, COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg 28.04.2015.

[24] *Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper* {SEC(2004) 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570}, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels 12.05.2004.

[25] M. Emerson, *Making sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean*, "CEPS Policy brief", No. 155, March 2008.

and a secure and peaceful region cannot be achieved without peace in the Middle East.

Taking into account international attempts to ensure collective security in the Mediterranean region, peace operations have had various goals depending on the nature of the conflict. This distinction should take into account various conditions in the longstanding disputes in the Middle East and in the North African part of the Mediterranean.

Peace Operations in the Middle East

For many years the Middle East, as an integral part of the Mediterranean, has been suffering from disputes. Its multidimensional nature has forced the international community to become involved in the peace process. The main multilateral network for cooperation in settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the Quartet (United Nations, European Union, United States and Russia) and the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform. The Quartet's mandate, formulated in 2002, is to help and support Middle East peace negotiations and Palestinian institution-building. Regular meetings are held among the UN Secretary General, the US Secretary of State, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Foreign Minister of Russia, as well as Quartet Special Envoys.[26] The International Task Force on Palestinian Reform is composed of representatives of the Quartet, Japan, Norway, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It monitors implementation of Palestinian civil reforms.

The UN has been strongly engaged in the Middle East region in a wide range of fields, including political mediation, peace operations and humanitarian support. The first peacekeeping operation established by the UN was UNTSO – the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. It was set up in May 1948 by UN Security Council resolution 50 (1948) to supervise the truce in Palestine. Additional functions were assigned by SC resolution 73 (1949). Since then, UNTSO military observers have supervised armistice agreements, monitored ceasefires and assisted other UN operations in the region.[27]

The first UN peacekeeping force was UNEF (the United Nations Emergency Force), as a response to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. As no decision could have been adopted in the Security Council due to the vetoes of the United Kingdom and France, the Security Council resolution called "Uniting for peace" from October 1956 was

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[26] http://www.quartetoffice.org/index.php (access 2.11.2016).
[27] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ (access 30.10.2016).

referred to an emergency special session of the General Assembly (GA), which established UNEF. The mandate was to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities," including withdrawal of foreign armed forces. It was not a peace enforcement operation, however, but a peacekeeping mission based on the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. At Egypt's request, the UNEF was withdrawn in 1967.[28] As a result of the Six-Day War in 1967, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the occupied territories and acknowledgment of the sovereignty of every state in the area.[29] Due to the later Yom Kippur War, the Security Council by resolution 338 called for a ceasefire and implementation of resolution 242. At the same time, in resolution 340, the SC decided to set up a new UNEF II mission, which demanded a complete ceasefire and withdrawal of the parties to their previous positions. UNEF II was supported by UNTSO military observers and in its humanitarian assistance also cooperated with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The UNEF II mandate was initially approved for a period of six months, but then it was renewed by the Security Council several times until July 1979.[30]

The United Nations has also been present in Lebanon and Syria. In 1958, the Security Council established the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) "so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders".[31] Its mandate was limited only to observation. When the tensions eased, UNOGIL was withdrawn (on 9 December 1958). In 1978, the SC also created UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Its mandate was revised several times, and after 2006 the Security Council added new duties to the mission, such as humanitarian assistance. However, the biggest challenge for the UN and the whole international community is the recent situation in Syria. In response to the Syrian civil war, the Security Council decided to set up the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with 300 unarmed military observers (with a civilian component), which was initially established for 90 days "to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties as well as the full implementation of the United Nations Joint Special Envoy's six-point proposal to end the conflict".[32] On 20 July 2012, the SC extended the UNSMIS mission for another 30 days, which could

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[28] Ibidem.
[29] *UN Security Council (SC) Resolution*, S/RES/242(1967), 22 November 1967.
[30] UN SC Resolution 438 extended the UNEF II mandate for the last time.
[31] *UN SC Resolution* 128 (1958), 11 June 1958.
[32] *UN SC Resolution* 2043 (2012), S/RES/2043, 21 April 2012.

be further extended only "in the event that the Secretary-General reports and the Security Council confirms the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides".[33] The UNSMIS mandate terminated on 19 August 2012, as the conditions for extension had not been fulfilled.[34]

As can be seen from recent dynamic changes in the region, the UN response to violation of international law is not satisfactory. Even though there have been a few UN missions in the Middle East, the UN involvement in this area has little impact on political changes in the region, but most of its successes are in humanitarian assistance.[35] This results mainly from the dynamics of the region and its geostrategic importance for many actors.[36] But the reason also lies in the lack of appropriate preventive measures taken by the international community before the escalation of conflicts (case of Syria).

The Mediterranean is considered a priority area for the European Union. The EU fears the spill-over effect of political and security instability in the region. It has already used various instruments towards the settlement of the Middle East conflicts.[37] Concerning multilateral cooperation in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the EU participates in the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, and due to participation in the Quartet, the EU is committed to assisting in the implementation of the Roadmap. It also conducts its own missions. Although there have been a small number of EU operations, they show the EU's willingness to be perceived as an active player in the Middle East. These are:

- EUBAM Rafah – the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point. It was launched in November 2005 as a civilian crisis management mission, within the CSDP, in order to help the implementation of the "Agreement of Movement and Access" between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The EU was supposed to act as a third party

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[33] *UN SC Resolution* 2059 (2012), S/RES/2059, 20 July 2012.

[34] The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) established in 1974 has remained in the region due to the tense situation in the Middle East http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/undof/mandate.shtml (access 5.11.2016).

[35] To enhance UN involvement in the Middle East peace process, the position of UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and the office of UNSCO (Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process) was established in the 1990s, more: http://www.unsco.org/Default.asp (access 4.11.2016).

[36] A. Saikal, *The United Nations and the Middle East*, in: *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, struggles, challenges*, eds. A. Saikal, A. Schnabel, United Nations University Press, Tokyo/New York/Paris 2003, p. 63.

[37] T. Özgür Kaya, *The Middle East peace process and the EU. Foreign Policy and Security Strategy in International Politics*, I.B. TAURIS, London/New York 2012, pp. 158–159.

at the crossing point in Gaza. The mission has been extended several times.

- EUPOL COPPS – the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support. It has provided civil police training and was engaged in the reconstruction of judicial facilities.[38] It shows the EU's attempt to maximize its influence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which may be valuable also in North Africa.[39]

Besides these civilian missions, there are no military CSDP operations carried out in the Middle East.[40] EU diplomacy takes the lead only in particular crisis management actions, leaving the overall mediation process for the United States. The EU consistently supports the UN actions towards a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, emphasizing the multilateral framework of cooperation. At the same time, it provides financial aid to the Palestinians in supporting "state" building. In the last decade most of the EU help has been used for humanitarian assistance.[41] Through its financial aid to UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)[42] and contribution to the UNIFIL (EU member states provided a key amount of 7,000 troops and operational command), the EU substantially and directly highlights the partnership with the UN in peacekeeping actions in the Middle East.[43] It is more successful in being a "promoter of effective multilateralism" than the key actor in the peace process, but through cooperation with other external players, such as the UN and the US, it gradually strengthens its profile as a security actor.[44] In response to internal violent repressions in Syria, the EU has suspended the cooperation under the European Neighbourhood Policy with the Syrian government. The EU and its members have allocated €6.8 billion in humanitarian and development assistance. Additional quotas have been extended for *inter alia* Syrian refugees, particularly their host communities in Jordan, Leba-

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[38] N. Tocci, B. Voltolini, *Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. A story of concentric circles*, in: *European Foreign Policies. Does Europe still matter?*, eds. R. Tiersky, J. van Oudenaren, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham/Plymouth 2012, p. 119.

[39] P. Pawlak, *From protecting to rebuilding: the EU's role in Libya*, in: *Preventing conflict, managing crisis. European and American perspectives*, eds. E. Gross, D. Hamilton, C. Major, H. Riecke, Center for Transatlantic relations, Washington D.C. 2011, p. 74.

[40] P.M. Norheim-Martinsen, *The European Union and military force. Governance and Strategy*, Cambridge University Press 2013, p. 151.

[41] N. Tocci, B. Voltolini, op.cit., pp. 117–118.

[42] The EU is the largest donor to the UNRWA.

[43] In addition to the EU's own involvement, it also expressed its support for the UN Special Envoy for Syria.

[44] T. Özgür Kaya, op.cit., pp. 213–214.

non, Iraq and Turkey.[45] The EU has paid special attention to cooperation with Turkey – at the end of 2015 the Union announced establishment of a refugee facility to support Syrian refugees and host communities in Turkey.[46] In June 2013, the EU prepared a comprehensive approach to the Syrian crisis.[47] The Union response aims at a political solution to the crisis, prevention of spill-over to the immediate neighbourhood, as well as response to the dramatic humanitarian situation.[48]

Peace Operations in North Africa after Emergence of the Arab Spring

The "awakening" of the Arab countries' societies has significantly changed the situation in the Mediterranean. The suicide of a 26-year-old Tunisian at the end of 2010 sparked massive protests, beginning in Tunisia and then spreading to neighbouring countries.[49] Political changes in North Africa meant new conditions for the EU policy towards this region. The "Arab awakening" has become a challenge for the European Union's foreign and security policy and raised the question of how to deal with the dynamic situation in the Mediterranean.

The intervention in Libya has been a challenge in terms of multilateral security actions. In response to the uprising in Libya against the Gaddafi regime, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 1970[50] and 1973[51] condemning violations of human rights against the Libyan people. The resolutions provided measures to establish an arms embargo and a no-fly zone, and authorization to take necessary action through regional organizations to protect Libyan civilians. In September 2011, the Security Council established the UN Support Mission for Libya

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[45] https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/9889/syria-and-the -eu_en (access 3.11.2016).

[46] http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/migration/factsheet_financing_of_the_ facility_for_refugees_in_turkey_en.pdf (access 4.11.2016).

[47] This is complemented further by the EU regional strategy for Syria, Iraq and the Da'esh threat. More: *Elements for and EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat*, JOIN(2015) 2 final, Brussels, 6.02.2015, available: https://eeas.europa.eu/ sites/eeas/files/20150206_join_en.pdf (access 5.11.2016)

[48] *Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis*, JOIN(2013) 22 final, Brussels 24.06.2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/130624_1_comm_native_ join_2013_22_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v10_p1_7332751.pdf (access 4.11.2016).

[49] A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, *Arabska wiosna – przyczyny, przebieg i prognozy*, "Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe", nr II/18/2001, p. 43.

[50] *UN SC Resolution* 1970 (2011), S/RES/1970 (2011), 26 February 2011.

[51] *UN SC Resolution* 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011.

(UNSMIL), a special political mission set up after several months of revolt to support the country's post-conflict democratic transition.[52] SC resolution 2095 (14 March 2012) extended its mission for the next 12 months.

Adoption of UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 in 2011 gave the mandate for the NATO mission in Libya, thus reaffirming that multilateral operations supported by the UN are still possible. The success of this action would not have been possible without support from the Arab League and the African Union, in operational and political aspects.[53] The NATO-led "Operation Unified Protector" was aimed at fulfilling the SC resolutions by enforcement of the no-fly zone and arms embargo. The mission was terminated on 31 October 2011, after having achieved its goals.[54]

The EU expressed its will to make a contribution to Libya's transition process in several areas: democratization, institution building, and law enforcement.[55] The EU responded with diplomatic measures such as official statements, declarations, high-level meetings,and an additional financial package of €25 million offered through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.[56] But its response to the crisis revealed the lack of unanimity among EU member states, and led to such declarations as EUFOR Libya, a mission that never happened (even though it was approved by the Council).[57] It was meant to act as an EU military mission in support of humanitarian assistance operations, but was never launched (a condition was a request from the OCHA – the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – which was never provided). The failure of EUFOR Libya weakened the EU's position as an international security actor. The NATO mission should not be an explanation of the EU's inaction as a security actor.[58] More than two years after the beginning of the revolution in Libya, the Council finally decided to deploy the civilian CSDP mission in Libya – EUBAM Libya – as a border assist-

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[52] *UN SC Resolution* 2009 (2011), S/RES/2009 (2011), 16 September 2011.

[53] P. Pawlak, op.cit., p. 80.

[54] http://www.nato.int (access 26.09.2016).

[55] *Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Libya*, 3117th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 10.10.2011.

[56] F. Arcidiacono, op.cit., p. 3.

[57] *Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP on a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya)*, 1.04.2011.

[58] A. Gomez, *Was Eurfor Libya an April fool's joke?*, https://euobserver.com/opinion/32624 (access 2.11.2016).

ance mission.[59] It reaffirms the EU's willingness to provide assistance in migration control and border management. The situation at the Libyan borders was found to be a necessity in ensuring the country's stability. The EUBAM Libya mission should be seen as an example of the EU's efforts in supporting Libya's stability in line with UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011),[60] but its failure would have a negative impact on the EU's CSDP effectiveness.[61]

As a response to the fast-growing influx of immigrants coming to the EU from North Africa via the Mediterranean Sea, in June 2015 the European Council decided to launch EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia (currently the only EU military operation in this region), which is directed against traffickers and human smugglers in the Mediterranean Sea. It is a comprehensive response by the EU to the migration matter, with the aim to "disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea." Since June 2016 Operation Sophia has been given two additional tasks: "training of the Libyan coastguards and navy" and "contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya".[62]

Conclusions

The dynamic situation in the Mediterranean raises questions of stability in the region. The fact that the region is so diverse and EU member states have different national interests towards particular countries in the Mediterranean leads to a situation where multilateral actions in the region often do not achieve the expected results. One of the reasons is that countries usually prefer ad hoc multilateralism to institutional multilateralism. The EU's inability to promptly decide within the CSDP on the actions towards Libya in 2011 clearly confirms that. At a time when we have been observing the dynamic situation in North Africa, the Middle East peace process has been at an impasse since the beginning of the Arab revolutions and the first step made in the United Nations towards Palestinian statehood.[63] This

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[59] M. Hatzigeorgopoulos, L. Fara-Andrianarijaona, *EUBAM Libya: Story of a long-awaited CSDP mission*, "European Security Review", No. 66, May 2013, p. 2.

[60] F. Arcidiacono, op.cit., p. 4.

[61] The mandate of EUBAM Libya has been extended until 21 August 2017, more: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en.htm (access 3.11.2016).

[62] http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/ (access 5.11.2016).

[63] The General Assembly approved the upgrade of the Palestinian Authority's status from "entity" to "non-member observer state" in the UN GA Resolution 67/19, 29.11.2012.

mixture could cause further problems for stability in the region.[64] The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has been tested due to the unstable situation in Egypt after the outbreak of the Arab Spring. At the same time, further consequences of the Syrian civil war on the situation in the Middle East are uncertain. Regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia and Turkey, are competing for predominance in this area, and the Israel-Palestinian conflict is still an important part of their reckoning.[65] A two-state solution is the main scenario within the Quartet, but the EU and the US have different tactics. For the US, an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is necessary to create an Arab bloc against Iran. The only tool at the EU's disposal is the possibility to apply economic sanctions on Israel, but without US support it will not bring any results. A separate role of the EU in the Middle East peace process then seems unlikely.[66]

The UN remains the main security actor in the Mediterranean, but the EU and its member states have made progress in their security policy since the beginning of the CFSP. The European Union has conducted a few missions, but the EU's crisis management capabilities do not match the Union's political ambitions on the world stage.[67] Pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Federica Mogherini) is supported in her work by the EU Special Representatives deployed in conflict regions. In the Mediterranean, the High Representative can count on the support of the Special Representative for the Middle East peace process (until 2014 there was also one for the Southern Mediterranean region). The role of special representatives is limited to assisting in building a coherent vision of the EU as an important actor on the global stage.[68] Nevertheless, internal differences and a lack of unity towards external actors are an obstacle to the EU's becoming a global security player. In some cases, the European Union also displays inconsistency in its actions. This can be seen in its decision on the Middle East peace process. On the one hand, it imposes sanctions on the democratically elected Hamas government, while on the

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[64] A. Pijpers, *Western crisis response and the question of Palestine* in:*Preventing conflict, managing crisis. European and American perspectives*, eds. E. Gross, D. Hamilton, C. Major, H. Riecke, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C. 2011, p. 61.

[65] Ibidem, p. 62.

[66] Ibidem, p. 64.

[67] J.A. Emmanouilidis, *Europe's role in the Twenty-first Century* in:*The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century. How Europe can shape a new global order*, eds. T. Renard, S. Biscop, Ashgate, Farnham/Burlington 2012, p. 86.

[68] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy/eu-special-representatives?lang=en (access 26.08.2013).

other it does not do the same towards Israel in spite of its violations of human rights in the Occupied Territories. This is interpreted, especially by most Palestinians, as not being neutral in the dispute.[69]

As the Mediterranean disputes have a complex nature, peacekeeping operations require engagement of different types of actors, dealing with military and humanitarian assistance. The UN with the EU, and also with NATO, complement each other. NATO has military tools at its disposal to influence the tense situation in the Mediterranean.[70] Some NATO members are Mediterranean countries and therefore the establishment and maintenance of peace in this region is crucial for the whole organization.[71] The EU will take the opportunity to be guided by its own security interests in this area. The Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy from 2016 reflects the willingness of the EU to enhance its cooperation with the UN and shows the readiness of the CSDP to further complement UN peacekeeping missions. Solving conflicts in the Mediterranean is seen as necessary for addressing such threats as terrorism and the challenges of migration. Therefore, the EU reaffirms its readiness to cooperate through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and promote dialogue in regional conflicts in Syria and Libya. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, it will continue its cooperation with the Quartet and other stakeholders.[72] The key obstacle is the undeniable division among EU member states, which results in delayed reactions and mandates that are too weak to be well-managed.[73] Financial support and humanitarian assistance seem to be necessary, but not sufficient. To make the support transparent, the international community might also develop some monitoring mechanism within the multilateral cooperation. The Union's policy towards the Mediterranean thus needs to be renewed, as without the military component of its strategy it cannot accomplish its political and humanitarian goals. Stronger cooperation with other international actors seems to be crucial.[74]

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[69] T. Özgür Kaya, op.cit., p. 202.

[70] In October 2001, NATO launched the anti-terrorism maritime surveillance Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, which was succeeded by Sea Guardian in October 2016.

[71] After 11 September 2001, NATO expanded its actions to combat international terrorism by leading "Operation Active Endeavour" aimed at deterring terrorism in the Mediterranean.

[72] https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union (access 20.10.2016).

[73] F. Arcidiacono, op.cit., p. 7.

[74] S. Blockmans, *The EU's external action towards the Middle East: Resolution required*, "CEPS Commentary", 7 January 2013, Brussels, p. 3, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu's-external-action-towards-middle-east-resolution-required (access 2.11.2016).

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Key words: Peacekeeping, Mediterranean, European Union, UN, Security, Peace Operations

Abstract

Peacekeeping in the Mediterranean as an Ongoing Challenge for International Organizations: the EU Case

The Southern Mediterranean has always been a problematic region for the international community. After many years of instability in the Middle East and an ongoing impasse in relations between Israel and Palestinians, there came the question of the "Arab Spring" which emerged in 2011. The paper examines peacekeeping (operations) in the Middle East and North Africa. The main goal is to analyze the complexity of the threats and challenges emerging from the Mediterranean region, as well as the institutional framework for peacekeeping operations, with a focus on EU involvement in the Mediterranean. The article attempts to answer the question of whether a regional organization such as the EU has effective instruments to improve security in its southern neighbourhood.