ISSUE: 1/2026
- Volume 30
- Number 1
- 2026
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Studia Europejskie –
Studies in European Affairs
ISSN: 1428-149X
e-ISSN: 2719-3780
License
Articles published in the journal are under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0 International License
Publication co-financed by Ministry of Science and Higher Education pursuant to the Regulation of the Minister of Education and Science of 3 August 2021 (Journal of Laws of 2021, item 1514) on the “Development of Scientific Journals” programme.
Publikacja dofinansowana przez Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego na podstawie rozporządzenia Ministra Edukacji i Nauki z 3 sierpnia 2021 r. (Dz. U. z 2021 r. poz. 1514) w sprawie programu „Rozwój czasopism naukowych”.
Publication co-financed by the University of Warsaw within the “Excellence Initiative – Research University” programme.
Czasopismo otrzymało dofinasowanie w ramach Programu „Inicjatywa Doskonałości – Uczelnia Badawcza”.
The Geopolitical Energy Transition Between Russia and the EU (2014–2024): An Analysis of Germany’s Role in Reshaping Energy Security After the Ukraine Crisis
Abstract
This study examines the transformation of energy relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) from 2014 to 2024, with a specific focus on Germany’s pivotal role in redefining European energy security in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. While extensive literature has addressed EU–Russia energy ties, the mechanisms through which geopolitical shocks reshape energy policies – particularly the interplay between securitisation, diversification, and strategic leadership – remain insufficiently theorised. This article addresses this gap by posing the following research question: How did geopolitical developments, especially the 2022 Ukraine invasion, transform energy cooperation and confrontation between Russia and the EU, and what role did Germany play in this transition?
This study employs a qualitative methodology based on directed content analysis. The dataset comprises 147 documents, including official EU communications from the European Commission, Council, and Parliament, German government policy papers, Russian energy strategy documents, reports published by the International Energy Agency, and corporate disclosures from Gazprom and Uniper. The material was analysed through theory-driven coding based on the securitisation framework, operationalised across three analytical dimensions: geopolitical (competition over resources and transit routes); security (threat perception and vulnerability); and diversification (alternatives suppliers and infrastructure development). The findings reveal that Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine constituted a critical juncture, fundamentally disrupting the path-dependent model of cooperation exemplified by the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipeline projects. In response, the EU activated three interconnected approaches – geopolitical, security-oriented, and diversification-focused – while Germany transitioned from serving as a primary economic bridge to Moscow to becoming the central driver of Europe’s decoupling from Russian energy. This shift was operationalised through the REPowerEU plan, resulting in a reduction of Russian gas imports from 55% to under 5% for Germany, accelerated LNG infrastructure development, and an expedited renewable energy transition.
The study makes a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that securitisation theory, when disaggregated into geopolitical, security, and diversification mechanisms, provides a robust analytical framework for understanding how external shocks restructure energy dependencies. Empirically, it offers the first comprehensive analysis of Germany’s dual role – as both an enabler of interdependence and as a leader of decoupling – within a unified analytical framework. These findings have broader implications for understanding energy transitions in other geopolitical contexts.
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DOI: 10.33067/SE.1.2026.6
Language: English
Pages: 91-121
How to Cite:
Harvard
Rezapour, D. (2026) "The Geopolitical Energy Transition Between Russia and the EU (2014–2024): An Analysis of Germany’s Role in Reshaping Energy Security After the Ukraine Crisis". Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2026, pp. 91-121. DOI: 10.33067/SE.1.2026.6