Rada Ministrów bez ministrów? Wpływ struktury organizacyjnej Rady Unii Europejskiej na kształt procesu podejmowania decyzji: perspektywa konstruktywizmu społecznego

Abstract

The Council of the European Union is the EU’s main legislative body. In order to deal with the overwhelming amount of legislation, it created an organizational structure made up of working groups at the bottom, special senior committees in the middle and ministers at the top. Although many studies exist on the division of tasks between them, few explain the conditions under which these formations play an important role in the decision-making process. This study fills this gap. By implementing the social constructivist approach, it investigates the impact of the Council’s structure on the ministers’ direct involvement in law-making. A statistical analysis has been conducted to examine this question, based on the legislative proposals endorsed in the Council in the years 2000–2004. Four findings emerge from the analysis. Firstly, the formal aspects of decision-making, such as the legislative procedure, the voting rule and the legal instrument, do not affect the ministers’ activity. Secondly, no preference divergence effect between ministers has been identified. Thirdly, the substance of the legislative act plays the important role of salience and the European Parliament’s amendments increase the ministers’ involvement. Lastly, the Council formation to which the ministers belong has a profound impact on their great activity. It is likely in the TTE Council whereas unlikely in AGRIFISH, JHA and ECOFIN Councils.