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The Search for a New Global Order

Abstract: *This article proposes a 'hybrid' approach to the issue of global order, mixing theoretical and practical issues in the analysis carried out. From the theoretical point of view, it focuses on crucial ideas important in the normative, liberal (institutional) and neo-realistic schools of thinking on global affairs and global order. The analysis leads to the conclusion that, in the normative sense, there is currently a mess and nobody is ready and able to propose the kind of 'global code' (Z.Bauman) necessary and appropriate for a globalised world of 'network societies' (M.Castells). In the institutional sense, today we are witness to a series of new phenomena, like the G-20, BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as the further deepening of the process of European integration following the Treaty of Lisbon, which is not yet theoretically absorbed. Finally, in world of geopolitics one can observe an important power shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, at least in the economic sphere. According to the Author, as stated in his final conclusions, there are two major challenges ahead of the world: deeply mixed transnationalisation (i.e. the diminishing of the role of nation states, including major powers), and the rapidly growing consciousness of real global challenges (proliferation of nuclear arms, climate change, shrinking of raw materials and energy sources, environmental issues, etc.). Thus, in the author's opinion, experts in security issues and scholars specialising in international relations should prepare a kind of 'cooperative order' idea – an idea, which, however, for the first time in decades and maybe even centuries, should be proposed not by the West alone. This is the essence of the new global order which has been emerging after the collapse of the global (Western) markets in September 2008. It is still too early to judge if this particular moment is a true fault line leading to the creation of a new global order, but there are many signs leading to such a conclusion.*

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Introduction

The ‘International Order’, like many terms in contemporary social sciences (in this particular case in the discipline of international relations¹) is the subject of different opinions, proposals, suggestions, and even visions. Janusz Stefanowicz, who studied this issue in a separate work, singled out three such visions: utopian, realist, and systemic. The utopian vision, closely connected with liberal interpretations, calls for harmonious and peaceful international cooperation. It was deemed ‘naive’ by the author, while the systemic vision, close to structuralist concepts, while categorised as ‘intellectually charming’ was also considered insufficient due to its ‘high degree of abstraction’. As a result, Stefanowicz sympathised with the historically-proven realist school, and he is not an isolated case at all.²

Naturally, these various visions and interpretations continue to clash with each other. At the present stage, there is nothing to indicate that the different schools of thought will find a plan based on common ground in these debates. Some point to norms (both legal and moral) as fundamental to any ordering of the world; others stress the power factor; and still others the role of institutions.³ Thus, Roman Kuźniar is absolutely right to declare: ‘*there is no one theory of international order which could be the starting point for formulating a coherent model of a future order and the process for reaching it*’.⁴

However this state of affairs, which may be described as a certain theoretical helplessness, does not mean that the issue of the presently existing order – or the lack thereof – in today’s world should not be seriously studied. On the contrary, there are many signs indicating that, since the outbreak of the world economic/market crisis in September 2008, this issue has become more important than ever and in need of a new, fresh approach. The dynamics

¹ It should be stressed that ‘International Relations’ appeared as an independent discipline of social sciences immediately after World War I, i.e. after the collapse of the previous Order. L.J. Kiss, *Globalizálódás és külpolitika (Globalisation and Foreign Policy)*, Budapest 2003, p. 9, 10.

² J. Stefanowicz, *Ład międzynarodowy. Doświadczenie i przyszłość (The International Order. Past Experience and the Future)*, Warszawa 1996, p. 23. Cf. S.P. Sałajczyk, *Wizje rzeczywistości międzynarodowej (Visions of the International Reality)* in: *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza, struktura, dynamika (International Relations. Genesis, Structure, Dynamics)*, ed. E. Haliżak, R. Kuźniar, Warszawa 2000, p. 33–62.

³ On the paradigms of the realist, liberal and normative international order, see the studies by T. Łoś-Nowak, E. Haliżak and J. Symonides in: *Porządek międzynarodowy u progu XXI wieku (The International Order on the Verge of the 21st Century)*, ed. R. Kuźniar, Warszawa 2005, p. 21–107.

⁴ R. Kuźniar, *Kształt porządku międzynarodowego – między postulatami a ograniczeniami (The Shape of the International Order – Between Postulates and Limitations)* in: *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń (The World in the face of Contemporary Challenges and Threats)*, ed. J. Symonides, Warszawa 2010, p. 61.

of the changes taking place in the international arena since the beginning of the crisis have been particularly distinctive and, at the same time, there are many signs that we are dealing with much deeper changes than anyone could have expected or anticipated. For the current centres of power – including especially the USA, which has been at the centre since the collapse of the bilateral order and end of the Cold War – have been subject to a certain erosion, while simultaneously new, dynamic ones on the periphery (which, it should be noted, are not really new from the historical perspective) are emerging. These include China, India, and the whole group of states categorised as ‘emerging markets’.

In the existing definitions of the international order – which, it must be kept in mind greatly differ from each other – we can identify at least one constant feature, namely the fact that every order implies a balancing of powers and, in an optimal solution, strives to attain an equilibrium. There is order when the activities of states and non-governmental actors in the international arena reach a state that allows for harmonious cooperation and, at the same time, prevent an outbreak of new conflicts on a larger scale.⁵ Yet the post-Cold War period has lacked such a legal, treaty-based organisation of the international order, and it has seemed that the only ‘ordering power’ was the power and might of the United States of America, which has taken on the role of global hegemonic leader in the sense attributed to this notion in the works of Max Weber. But there has been no legitimisation of this monopoly in a legal, treaty-based sense. Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, no treaties were signed which would establish a new order. Attempts were made back in the early 1990s by then-President of the United States George H.W. Bush, who repeatedly used the term ‘new international order’ in his speeches, obviously meaning one dominated by the USA. His visions, however, remained nothing more than verbal declarations.⁶ While an actual change consisted in the fact that the former two poles or centres of

⁵ As an example, compare the following two definitions: W. Malendowski’s: ‘*the political order consists in the equilibrium of certain relations on the global scale, convergence and balancing out of the positions of states, as well as a state of good organisation in international co-existence*’ in: *Stosunki międzynarodowe (International Relations)*, ed. W. Malendowski, Cz. Mojsiewicz, Wrocław 2004, p. 544. A. Nowak, in turn, points out that the international (peaceful) order consists of a certain ‘*state in which there are functioning institutional, legal, political, economic and military safeguards preventing the use of violence, in which there is stabilization of the financial situation, and in which legal agreements are observed*’. in: *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe (Contemporary international Relations)*, ed. T. Łoś-Nowak, Wrocław 1997, p. 159.

⁶ L. Pastusiak, *Nowy ład światowy (The New Global Order)* in: *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe. Praca zbiorowa (Contemporary International Relations. A Joint Publication)*, Warszawa 2008, p. 109.

power were replaced by just one, the logic of the existing order did not undergo any significant change in the practical dimension. However, in the theoretical sense there was a change, insofar as the neo-realist current, which was the dominant school of thought during 1989–91, became temporarily dominated by neoliberal concepts.⁷

The USA's domination on the international stage immediately after the collapse of the bipolar order was initially real and unquestioned. However, now that this 'unipolar moment' of the USA as a dominant and hegemonic global leader has passed,⁸ an entirely new situation arises, which requires sorting out, both in the theoretical and, especially, in the practical political sense, in order to prevent future potential crises. What is more, due to the increasing global challenges and changes, this 'sorting out' is necessary not only in relations between sovereign states, as was the case in the 'post-Westphalian' age,⁹ but also taking into account non-state actors, which are constantly growing in power, as well as supranational state actors like the European Union. Moreover, these calculations also need to incorporate responses to phenomena which are threatening – for the first time in history – the entire human race. By this is meant issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, global terrorism, destruction of the environment, climate change, and the shrinking supplies of natural resources (including even clean air and water). In this sense, **the shaping of a new international order in the early 21st century is and will be, both in the theoretical and practical sense, much more complicated than it has ever been since 1648, when the**

⁷ L.J. Kiss, *Globalizálódás...*, op.cit., p. 51. According to the leading American economist and scholar Dani Rodrik, free market economics was in ascendancy since the 1980s, 'producing what has been variously called the Washington Consensus, market fundamentalism, or neoliberalism. Whatever the appellation, this belief system combined excessive optimism about what markets could achieve on their own with a very bleak view of the capacity of governments to act in socially desirable ways'. D. Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox. Democracy and the Future of the World Economy*, New York–London 2011, p. 77.

⁸ Already after the emergence of this single American pole, one of the most interesting modern theoreticians of international relations, Kenneth Waltz, prophetically predicted that sooner or later this will result in a coalition against this uni-polar structure and, consequently, a new multipolar order will be created, in the name of a realistic formula leading to a balance of power. See: K. Waltz, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, "International Security" Vol. 25/1/2000, p. 39, 40. Available on the Internet at: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf; N. Ferguson also reached similar conclusions, stating (in 2004) that: 'as Europe united and China grew richer, so the world would revert to a "multipolarity" not seen since before the Second World War', N. Ferguson, *Colossus. The Rise and Fall of America's Empire*, New York 2004, p. 17.

⁹ As regards the Westphalian Model and its consequences for the meaning of Sovereignty and International Order, see the excellent study by Daniel Philipott: *Revolutions in Sovereignty. How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton 2001.

first international order in history, called the Westphalian Order, was created.¹⁰

This article proposes a ‘hybrid’ solution, i.e. looking at the issue of international order at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century in three specific dimensions: normative, institutional, and the actual configuration of powers. Thus, from the theoretical point of view, this article uses all three paradigms to study this issue: normative; liberal (institutions); and realistic (configuration of powers). At the same time, these analyses are accompanied by a practical analysis of the current configuration of powers in the international arena, which, as already mentioned, has been undergoing dynamic changes recently.

1. The normative sphere

The previous international orders were the results of major conflicts and the treaties which concluded them. However, nothing like this occurred after the Cold War, which inclined Zbigniew Brzeziński to the observation that, in the normative sense, following the collapse of the bi-polar system the world has become uncontrolled by anyone, which is reflected in the title of one of his books, *Out of control*. Brzeziński characterised this new era as the ‘collapse [...] of almost all fixed values’.¹¹ Moreover, according to him, ‘the world resembles an airplane on autopilot which is constantly accelerating, but has no designated destination’.¹²

As we know, at the same time – in the early 1990s – Francis Fukuyama had a very different opinion on this issue, as presented in his highly optimistic study on the ‘end of history’.¹³ Fukuyama predicted, in contrast to the ‘pessimist’ Brzeziński, a triumph of Western liberal democracy and, among other phenomena, a new era of universal happiness. Now, just two decades later, we can see that this prophecy was not fulfilled. A symbol of the collapse of Fukuyama’s vision is the book by Robert Kagan under the telling title *Return of History and the End of Dreams*.¹⁴ In this work, published in 2008, Kagan states frankly that the assumptions that both China and Russia (states on which

¹⁰ In the almost unanimous opinion of scholars, the next crucial moments were: the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Congress of Versailles and the League of Nations (1919), the United Nations System created in 1945, followed almost immediately by the Cold War Order, or domination of two superpowers – the USA and the USSR.

¹¹ Z. Brzeziński, *Bezład (Out of Order)*, Warszawa 1994, p. 10.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 13 (translated from the Polish edition).

¹³ The Author, quoting Hegel, directly stated that ‘there were no alternative principles or forms of social and political organization that were superior to liberalism’, F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, London 1992, p. 64.

¹⁴ R. Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, New York 2008.

he particularly focuses) would follow the path of liberal democracy proved to be nothing but a pipe-dream and an illusion. Although Fukuyama, citing Seymour Martin Lipset, claimed that there is a high level of correlation between a stable democracy and a high level of economic development,¹⁵ the example of China in the last two decades seems to indicate that in terms of economic productivity, this thesis is not entirely true. In other words, predictions that the entire world would copy the Western, mainly American, model of politics and economic development proved to be wrong. Consequently, the 'pessimist' Brzeziński was closer to the truth than the 'optimist' Fukuyama, who, as a matter of fact, in his later works retracted his earlier theses. Indeed, under the influence of the events of 11 September 2001, he even risked a thesis which could be considered as almost heretic coming from a convinced liberal like himself, stating that: *'For individual societies and for the global community, the withering away of the state is not a prelude to utopia but to disaster'*.¹⁶

In accordance with the normative theory of international relations, the international order is a sum of three constituents: the norms (legal), the underlying system of values, and certain institutions and relations conditioning the existence of international society.¹⁷ Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, the main problem is that the existing institutions, starting with the United Nations (UN) as the sole universal repository of global order, are weakened and do not fully reflect the existing configuration of powers.¹⁸ Another concern is the fact that, under pressure from globalisation forces, the nation-state is eroding, losing many of the characteristics and assets of its sovereignty. The essence of this issue was most succinctly presented by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who stated: *'In order to actually exist, the nation-state has to control three fundamental autarkies: violence, culture and the economy. Nowadays, no state can pride itself on control over any of these autarkies... Production, finances, knowledge, crime – they either ignore the state or actively fight it, acting in the global space. The power is there. Politics, in turn, has remained as it was. Local, territorial, closed off in the legal and mental limitations of the nation-state'*.¹⁹

¹⁵ F. Fukuyama, *The End of History...*, op.cit., p. 109.

¹⁶ F. Fukuyama, *State Building. Governance and the World Order in the Twenty-First Century*, New York 2004, p. 120; translated from the Polish version: *Budowanie państwa. Władza i ład międzynarodowy w XXI wieku*, Poznań 2005, p. 137.

¹⁷ J. Symonides following J. Gilas in: *Porządek międzynarodowy...*, op.cit., p. 85.

¹⁸ It much rather reflects the configuration of powers from immediate post-World War II period, which is proven by the fact that Japan and Germany, at that time the defeated parties but now among the strongest economies in the world, are still applying for permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

¹⁹ *Nowy nieład światowy (New World Disorder)*, Z. Bauman in an interview with J. Żakowski, "Polityka" No. 51, 18.12.2010, p. 32.

Thus, states and institutions are weakened and the existing system of values is not at all universal. Proof of this can be seen in the alleged Asian values²⁰ and the tensions in relations between the USA and China. The controversy surrounding the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo constitutes a symbolic manifestation of this state of affairs. The controversy centred around the different approaches taken by China and the 'West' to many fundamental issues – human rights, individual freedom, the role of the state, etc.²¹ Consequently, we are facing a situation in which, in the normative sense, almost all fundamental elements constituting the understanding of international order in this paradigm are either weakened or undermined, if not subject to active dispute or controversy. In this context, we can understand Z. Bauman's appeal for the elaboration of some 'global code', not entirely defined yet, but without which – in Bauman's view – 'we will all go under'.²²

The fundamental problem is: Who will have the power or authority to enforce such a code? It is beyond dispute that the UN is not fulfilling this role. After a brief 'unipolar moment',²³ which lasted less than one generation, the United States has ceased to play the role of hegemonic leader. Today, in contrast to the predictions made two decades ago, no one speaks about the *Pax Americana* any longer. However, other centres of power are neither pronounced enough nor strong enough to independently impose anything on anyone, while ideas of *global governance* have not gone beyond the phase of academic speculation.²⁴ It would seem that all the most recent academic conceptions heralding a new world order have suffered a similar fate. For instance Andrew Hurrell, the well-known representative of the British school studying international relations – liberal in spirit and structuralist in form – rightly describes the 'importance of seeking to build institutions around the idea of common interests and common values' to be the prerequisite for a new global order.²⁵ However, what does he perceive to be the very essence of the

²⁰ See e.g. K. Gawlikowski, *Problem „wartości azjatyckich”. Uwagi o koncepcjach Mahathira bin Mohamada (On the 'Asian values'. Remarks on Mahathir bin Mohamad's concepts)*, „Azja-Pacyfik” Vol. II/1999, Toruń 1999, p. 192–237.

²¹ See: *Award Ceremony Speech* Thorbjørn Jagland, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Oslo, 10.12.2010, at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/presentation-speech.html Chinese reactions to this award: *Who is Liu Xiaobo?* at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-10/28/c_13579766.html

²² *Nowy wiek światowy*, op.cit.

²³ This term was introduced by the well-known columnist Charles Krauthammer.

²⁴ One of the most interesting works on this topic is *Governance in a Globalising World*, ed. J.S. Nye, J.D. Donahue, Washington 2000.

²⁵ A. Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*, New York 2009, p. 55.

'new constitution of international society' which he calls for? He points to 'liberal solidarity'.²⁶ In other words, he believes that a new order can only be built upon the individualistic system of values developed in the West. However, the changes currently taking place in the global arena – which is the main subject of this study – seem to indicate that we have now arrived at a point where the system of values common for the entire planet will have to be developed in co-operation with non-Western powers (superpowers?).²⁷

The situation – already difficult – becomes even more complicated when we consider the phenomenon emphasised by Janusz Symonides: '*The specificity of the international community, the lack of a central executive power, legislative power and compulsory judicature, leads to the questioning of the current character or effectiveness of norms of international law in the science of international relations*'.²⁸ Such a phenomenon, by the way, can be noticed not only in political science, but also in political practice, where the dispute over values has just flared up, mainly in the context of the alternative development model presented in recent years by China and symbolised by the departure from, if not substitution of, the liberal Washington Consensus in many countries with an anti-liberal, statist-market Beijing Consensus.²⁹ This is an

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 20, 296.

²⁷ This is the thesis strongly underlined by Charles Kupchan in his interview given to the Polish monthly *Europa – miesięcznik idei* (*Europe – A Monthly Journal of Ideas*). According to him: '*The ideological supremacy of the West is, however, not independent from its economic and military position. Following the decline in both of those dimensions, the Western ideological hegemony will also come to the end... The world in the twenty-first century will be not only multilateral, but also pluralistic; i.e. we will see co-existence of different political and economic models. One of them, no doubt, will be the Western model, the other will come from China as authoritarian capitalism*', „Europa” No. 7/2011, p. 12,13.

²⁸ J. Symonides, *Normatywne teorie ładu międzynarodowego po zimnej wojnie* (*Normative Theories of the Post-Cold War International Order*) in: *Porządek międzynarodowy...*, op.cit., p. 85.

²⁹ On the Washington Consensus in Polish literature, see: E. Haliżak *Ideowe podstawy globalnego ładu liberalnego w gospodarce światowej – rola i znaczenie Washington Consensus* (*The Ideological Basis of the Global Liberal Order in World Economy – the Role and Significance of the Washington Consensus*) in: *Globalizacja a stosunki międzynarodowe* (*Globalization and International Relations*), ed. E. Haliżak, R. Kuźniar, J. Symonides, Bydgoszcz–Warszawa 2004, p. 12–30. The term '*Beijing Consensus*' was coined in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo in the paper *The Beijing Consensus*, The Foreign Policy Center, London May 2004. For more on the Chinese development model see: B. Góralczyk *The Role of China in a Globalised World*, "Yearbook of Polish European Studies" No. 13/2010. The Washington Consensus involved, among other things, privatisation, liberalisation of markets and trade, and weakening of the public sector. The neo-authoritarian Beijing Consensus involves quite the opposite – a strong and active role of the state, next to the market, as well as the rule 'market before democracy'. For the most prominent criticism of the neo-liberal order and the American policy after the Cold War, particularly as pursued by the administration of G.W. Bush, see: N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine. The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, New York 2007.

opinion shared by, among others, such renowned scholars as Dani Rodrik, Charles Kupchan, and Fareed Zakaria, as well as authors who are dealing with this issue directly, such as Stephan Halper³⁰ or Kishore Mahbubani.³¹ Not surprisingly, this point is even more strongly underscored by some Chinese authors, like Liu Mingfu in his work – famous in China – entitled *China Dream* (an obvious echo of the ‘American Dream’),³² as well as by the collaborative authors of another popular volume on Mainland China in recent years, which interestingly says directly: ‘*China is not happy*’.³³

Consequently, we are in serious trouble in the normative sense, in both its theoretical and practical aspects. There is a shortage of universal values, the institutional system (UN) is ailing, and there are simply no central executive or legislative powers on a broad, global scale. Meanwhile, in the globalised world – in which there has been a ‘compression of the space-time continuum’³⁴ and consequently the sense of living in a single place is growing – the concept of the world as a single community is gaining importance, but in the normative sense there is no single, commonly accepted normative model for this world, and in addition there are no centralised powers able to impose their will on others. Put succinctly, in the normative sense the contemporary world is not in the most fortunate moment in its history. It lacks fundamental answers to the key global challenges mentioned above, while at the same time the new scientific and technological revolution, called the information revolution,

³⁰ S. Halper, *The Beijing Consensus. How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*, New York 2010. The author is quoting the top Chinese legislator Wu Bangguo, who said openly that the Chinese system ‘*shall never simply copy the system of Western countries or introduce a system of multiple parties holding office in rotation, a system with the separation of the three powers or a bicameral system*’, p. 147. Importantly, even the Chinese political-scientist and theoretician of democracy who is most well-known in the West, professor Yu Keping from Beijing University, does not believe that China should move toward an American-style system based on a tripartite division between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. See: Cheng Li in Introduction to: Yu Keping, *Democracy is a Good Thing. Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China*, Washington 2009, p. XX.

³¹ K. Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere. The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*, New York 2008.

³² Liu Mingfu, *Zhongguo Meng (China Dream)*, Beijing 2010. The author predicts that in the ‘post-American world’, which we are already in, China will emerge as a new kind of world leader, coordinating efforts with others (*wang dao*) rather than dominating others (*ba quan*) as the Americans were doing, p. 133. As a colonel of the Chinese Army, he also stresses the important role of a strong Chinese Armed Forces, p. 267.

³³ *Zhongguo bu gaoxing*, Nanjing 2009. The authors of this volume are: Wang Xiaodong, Liu Yang, Song Xiaojun, Song Qiang, and Huang Jisu.

³⁴ A term used by M. Pietras, after M. Kempny, in the article *Paradygmat globalizacji in statu nascendi (The Paradigm of Globalization In Statu Nascendi)* in: *Porządek międzynarodowy...*, op.cit., p. 152.

squeezes time and space even tighter and has brought about a fundamental change in the global arena, perceptively designated by the sociologist Manuel Castells the 'network society'.³⁵

Moreover, as the well-known theoretician of international relations James N. Rosenau has aptly pointed out, with globalisation mankind has entered an era of dramatically increasing interactions, leading to unprecedented 'turbulences' on a mass scale. He groups them into five types: unexpected technological surge of the post-industrial era; emergence of completely new global challenges (HIV, environmental pollution, global terror, global financial crises and the emergence of the global economy); disaggregation of the powers of nation-states; which is combined with and interacting with the increased aggregation of the roles of non-state players; and growing interdependence, vitiating territorial boundaries.³⁶ The present era is different not only in degree but in kind when compared with the earlier times. This 'new' world is almost totally different from the 'old' one, i.e. the one preceding the present phase of globalisation.

While the 'classical' society was a community of sovereign states, the 'network society' is characterised by: (i) a global economy, i.e. the ability to act in real-time at any point on the planet, with the financial markets also having a global character instead of a regional or national one (money, and even capitals, have freed themselves from control of the states); (ii) unprecedented internationalization of production, with the economic centre (and, to a certain extent, the technical centre as well) of the entire globe moving to the Asia-Pacific region; and (iii) information (carried by new inventions, such as the Internet, mobile telephone networks, satellite television) freed from the control of states. Such a state of affairs quite rightly induced Castells to propose the thesis that in the early 21st century, the world not only exists in an era of 'turbulences', as James Rosenau claimed two decades ago, but even in a 'condition of structural schizophrenia'.³⁷ **Therefore, now more than ever before it is paramount to conduct a normative and institutional ordering of these many dimensions of the new world, but there is a lack of a uniform, consistent vision of such an order, as well as of the institutions and centres of power which would be able to put a vision of a new normative order and universal values into practice.**

³⁵ Castells thus defined it in the trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture* (Vol. 1. *The Rise of the Network Society*, Vol. 2. *The Power of Identity*, Vol. 3. *End of Millennium*), published by Oxford University Press since 1998 (with many revised versions).

³⁶ J.N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton 1990, p. 22, 33.

³⁷ M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd edition, Wiley-Blackwell 2010, p. 3.

2. The institutional framework

Just as in the normative sense we are dealing with an obvious shortage of ideas, so too in the institutional sense the 2008 crisis in the world markets (considered in this article to be an important turning point, although we are still lacking the necessary historical perspective to produce a more balanced evaluation on this issue) has brought about significant and clearly visible changes. There is no doubt that until the crisis broke out, important decisions in the global arena were taken in informal meetings, primarily those of the G7 established in 1975 (after Russia joined the Group in the 1990s, its name was changed to the G8).³⁸ Already as early as in June 1999, at the summit in Cologne, the Group put forward the proposal to establish a broader body, the G20, an idea however which remained in a state of hibernation for nearly a decade.³⁹ The crisis of September 2008 became the catalyst for the establishment of this body in practice, which took place as early as in November 2008 at the first G20 Summit in Washington. This meeting of world leaders, and the others which followed it – in London (April 2009), Pittsburgh (September 2009), Toronto (June 2010) and Seoul (November 2010) – and the agreements reached thereat proved that, **at least in the economic (and financial) dimension, we are already dealing with a new quality in the international arena.** The following phenomena both constitute and reflect this new quality:⁴⁰

- The replacement in practice of the G7 (G8) by the G20, which is proof of the relative drop in importance in the international economic arena of the western countries, including in particular the USA, but also the major centres of power in the EU as well;
- The composition of the G20 is proof of a tremendous rise in importance in the international arena of the so-called emerging markets, starting with the three largest, China, India, and Brazil, which have recently shown high rates of across-the-board growth;
- The G20 is taking over, to an increasingly larger extent, the tasks of the main institutional mechanism governing the global economic

³⁸ The idea came from the French President of that time, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and it received strong support of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher. Members of the G7 were: the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany and Japan. For more see at: <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/g7.asp>

³⁹ For more see: <http://www.g20.org/index.aspx>

⁴⁰ What follows is based on communiqués from the Summits available on the abovementioned website, as well as: A. Gradziuk, M. Koczor, *Wyniki szczytu G20 w Toronto (The Results of the G20 Summit in Toronto)*, "Biuletyn PISM" (Bulletin of the Polish Institute of International Affairs) No. 100, 1.07.2010; *In-depth coverage of G20 from the Financial Times*, at: <http://www.ft.com/indepth/g20>

arena, which was – and still remains, although in weakened form – the Bretton Woods System,⁴¹ a system consisting primarily of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This G20 is now transforming itself into the main forum for international economic cooperation;

- The G20 has set for itself the task of pulling the world out of the global crisis, as proven by the programme it adopted at the Summit in Pittsburgh Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth”, and the fact that it is discussing changes within the IMF and the World Bank;
- The G20 also monitors the commitments undertaken within the World Trade Organization (WTO), the OECD, and the UNCTAD, which seems to confirm its superior role over the other existing institutions of the global economic order;
- **The composition of the G20, and its programmes and tasks, give rise to the critical conclusion that, at least in the economic sense, the world has once more become multipolar** and that states previously considered ‘developing’, ‘third world’ or ‘post-colonial’ have become significant centres of power in their own right in this new order. This is an entirely new qualitative state of affairs for the ‘West’ as broadly understood. It has still not mentally come to terms with this change, and the fact that, from now on, signals coming from Beijing, New Delhi, Moscow or Brazil should be watched as carefully as those coming from Washington, London or Berlin, as was the case in the not-very- recent past.

Apart from the G20, in June 2009 another body emerged with aspirations to be an institution ordering the world markets. The date of its establishment, the formulation of its activities, and its stated aims should be considered symbolic. This body is known as BRIC, based on the acronym of a group consisting of the largest ‘emerging markets’ – Brazil, Russia, India and China. At its first summit Yekaterinburg (subsequent summits were held in April 2010 in Brazil, and in April 2011 in China),⁴² BRIC set three major tasks for itself:

⁴¹ Officially, apart from the IMF and the WB (IBRD), this system includes the International Finance Cooperation (IFC, established in 1956) and the International Development Association (IDA, established in 1961). For more on the tasks and role of the Bretton Woods System see: B.J. Cohen *Bretton Woods System*, at: <http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/inpress/bretton.html> and the analysis *The Bretton Woods System* at: <http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/bre.html>

⁴² For a review of the summits and tasks of BRICS see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIC>.

- Reform of the UN system;
- Increasing the role of developing states in world financial institutions (i.e.: increasing the weighted votes in the Bretton Woods system, which is already incrementally taking place);
- Creation of a new monetary system. It should be noted that it is not entirely clear what this means; whether the creation of a single global currency, as was proposed by China at the G20 Summit in London, or the diversification of markets, taking into account the weakening of the US dollar, which is one of the pillars of the Bretton Woods system.

As proof of the dynamic character of this organisation, one need look no further than the fact that South Africa was invited to the third BRIC Summit (held in April 2011 in China) and that it became a permanent member of the organisation, the name of which was thus changed to BRICS.⁴³ With this move, another dynamic market, the strongest in Africa, has been included in the organisation and the role of South Africa as an important actor in the international arena has been confirmed – a fact which was made quite evident during the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009. It should be recalled that during this summit the main voice of the ‘emerging markets’, i.e. China, asked South Africa to co-present their common views to the West, which resulted in a fiasco of the entire Summit, as the two parties thus defined were not able to find a common language or programme.⁴⁴ There is no doubt that China is the driving force behind BRICS.⁴⁵ If China continues to have the same growth rate as over the last three decades, i.e. an annual growth rate of about 10 per cent, in the not-too-distant future it will almost certainly become the world’s leading economic power,⁴⁶ which would obviously have enormous consequences, both economic and other, in the global arena.

⁴³ *Building BRICS*, at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-12/31/c_13671704.html. It was stressed in this article that the five BRICS member states currently contribute more than 60 per cent of world economic growth.

⁴⁴ A detailed journalist analysis of the clash of the Western states with BRIC was presented by “Der Spiegel”. The weekly cited President Nicolas Sarkozy, who said that ‘*China will soon be the biggest economic power in the world*’: *How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit*, at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,692861,00.html>

⁴⁵ D. Rothkopf, *What BRIC would be without China...* According to the author: ‘*Without China, the BRIC is just the BRI, a bland, soft cheese that is primarily known for the wine that goes with it. China is the muscle of the group and the Chinese know it. They have effective veto power over any BRIC initiative, because without them, who cares really? They are the one with the big reserves. They are the biggest potential market*’ at: <http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/15> (last visited 08.15.2011).

⁴⁶ According to the Chinese strategist and economist Professor Hu Angang: ‘*I want to project that China would become a superpower by 2020 – politically, militarily, and in terms of soft science and technology – in pure economic terms*’. Hu Angang, *China in 2020. A New Type of Superpower*, Washington 2011, p. 11.

China – along with Russia – is also the main actor in yet another organisation, the importance of which also seems to be continually growing. This is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO was established in 2001 on the basis of the previously developed Chinese-Russian dialogue.⁴⁷ The SCO is a political group, an economic bloc, a military alliance, and even an organisation specialising in combating terrorism (with its seat in Tashkent). The existence of the SCO has made possible something which would have been completely out of the question even just a few years earlier, namely military manoeuvres with the participation of Russian troops in China and vice versa. The SCO points its sword at the West to an even larger extent than BRICS does. It is, therefore, no surprise that American analysts are beginning to view this organisation as a ‘Warsaw Pact 2’ or an ‘anti-NATO’.⁴⁸

The documents adopted at the tenth summit of Heads of SCO States in June 2010 in Tashkent indicate that among the ‘*profound changes and fundamental transformations taking place in today’s dynamically developing world*’ the SCO States particularly value the return to multi-polarity. The heads of these states declared that they ‘*are united in their assessment of changes happening in the world, which involve not only new challenges and threats, but also provide opportunities for progress towards a more just political and economic world order (not defined, however – B.G.) based on the rule of international law, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation of all countries in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter*’. They also noted the growing role of the SCO, and with regard to this fact, supported the aims of the so called ‘Tashkent initiative’ of 2004, which put forward the main goal of strengthening the cooperation of countries in the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁹ Proof of the determination behind the objectives set and actions taken can be seen in the fact that all these theses were repeated a year later at the meeting commemorating the 10th anniversary of the SCO.⁵⁰

The dynamic growth of the biggest economies in the group of ‘emerging markets’, of which the most important, China and India, are located in Asia, has led some analysts and scholars to the conclusion that the economic centre of the world – and with it the political and technological centre, etc. – will

⁴⁷ Details on the webpage of that organisation at: <http://www.sectSCO.org/> The following states are members of this group: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, while India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia have the status of observers.

⁴⁸ R. Kagan, *The Return of History...*, op.cit., p. 74.

⁴⁹ *Declaration of the Tenth Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, Tashkent, 11.06.2010, at: <http://www.sectSCO.org/EN/show.asp?id=225> (last visited 08.15.2011).

⁵⁰ See: *Joint Communiqué of meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation commemorating the 10th anniversary of the SCO*, Astana, 14–15.06.2011, at: <http://www.sectSCO.org/EN/show.asp?id=293> (last visited 08.15.2011).

shift from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region.⁵¹ The available statistical figures indicate this has already happened in the economic dimension.⁵² In many studies, for example in the well-known volumes by Kishore Mahbubani,⁵³ Parag Khanna,⁵⁴ or Fareed Zakaria,⁵⁵ there are theses indicating that we are already dealing with a new quality in the international arena, as – according to them – the emerging markets are dynamically gaining power, the ‘twilight of America’ is taking place and the hegemony of the USA has reached its end, and Asia is not only modernising itself but also competing in the high technology markets. Meanwhile China has proposed an alternative development model to the world, a model that undermines many of the political and economic theories which, until now, were considered sacrosanct, and not only in the West. This new strategic dynamism introduces a mechanism based on opposition – ‘old America, new Asia’.⁵⁶

In the context of a potential ‘twilight of the West’,⁵⁷ another phenomenon is being examined, one which is, next to those discussed above, of utmost importance in the contemporary world in the institutional sense. This is the unprecedented process of European integration, heading towards the creation of

⁵¹ K. Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere...* op.cit.

⁵² The breakthrough achievement in studying this phenomenon, together with the necessary statistics, factual material and statistical data, is the volume edited by David Shambaugh, *Power Shift. China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2005.

⁵³ K. Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere...* op.cit. However, an earlier work by this experienced diplomat, currently one of the major intellectuals and strategists of Singapore, is also important: *Can Asians Think?*, 4th edition, Singapore 2009. In this work the author proposes, among other things, the following interesting thesis: ‘if we wanted to hear the best geopolitical discussions, we should go to Washington, DC, or New York. However, if we wanted to see the best geopolitical performance, we should go to Beijing’, p. 199.

⁵⁴ P. Khanna, *The Second World. How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century*, New York 2009.

⁵⁵ F. Zakaria, *The Post American World*, New York 2008. Zakaria sees China as a major challenger of the US and the whole West. He claimed, much earlier than others, that China ‘has become the second most important country of the world’, p. 93.

⁵⁶ Such a thesis was proposed in the debate on the book by K. Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere*, op.cit. in “Asia Policy”, No. 8/2009, p. 163.

⁵⁷ Spectacularly visible during the last G20 summit meeting in French Cannes in November 2011, when everyone was talking about the crisis in Greece, Italy and the whole Eurozone, while the host, French President Nicholas Sarkozy, was openly asking China for financial assistance and received the following significant answer from his Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao: ‘It has to be dependent mainly on Europe to resolve the European debt problem’. See: *Hu meets Sarkozy ahead G20 summit at*: <http://www.ecns.cn/2011/11-03/3511.shtml> (last visited 11.06.2011). See also: *All eyes will be on Hu Jintao at G20 summit in Cannes*, “China Times”, 30.10.2011; *Europe must resolve debt crisis, China tells France*, France24, 03.11.2011, see at: <http://www.france24.com/en/20111103-europe-must-resolve-debt-crisis-china-tells-france-hu-jintao-sarkozy-g20>

the first supranational body in history, the European Union (EU).⁵⁸ With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the EU entered its next stage of integration, consisting in appointing a President of the Council of the EU (the informal head of state) and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the informal head of diplomacy), as well as in the commencement of the creation of a joint EU diplomatic corps, i.e. the European External Action Service (EEAS).⁵⁹ Even though the fiasco of the referendums in France and the Netherlands (whose citizens rejected the bold idea of implementing a new European Constitution) slowed down the process of deepening EU integration, its logic still leads – in a sense, in accordance with the neo-functional theory⁶⁰ – to one logical culmination: the functioning of a consciously established supranational federalist entity which, under the Lisbon Treaty, has finally become a subject of international law.

A very important step in the process of European integration was the official establishment of the euro area, which has come to be called the Eurozone (sometimes also ‘eurozone’, or ‘euro zone’). While the Eurozone does not cover all 27 EU Member States (only 17, following Estonia’s joining on 1 January 2011), nevertheless it still remains a very important and most interesting experiment on a global scale, as a supranational currency has been established under it by means of a largely ‘top-down’ decision. Unfortunately, as a result of the September 2008 crisis, the Eurozone is suffering a serious crisis, one which is undoubtedly its worst since its entry into force on 1 January 1999. There are many symptoms of this crisis: the collapse of the Greek market, to which the EU Member States and the European Central Bank have not managed to find a remedy for endless months, and the danger that other countries of the Eurozone, the so-called PIIGS States (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece

⁵⁸ For more, see, e.g., *Unia Europejska. Nowy typ wspólnoty międzynarodowej (The European Union. A New Type of International Community)*, ed. E. Halizak, S. Parzymies, Warszawa 2002. On the role of the EU in the international arena see: D. Milczarek, *Pozycja i rola Unii Europejskiej w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Wybrane aspekty teoretyczne (The Position and Role of the European Union in international relations. Selected Theoretical Aspects)*, Warszawa 2003.

⁵⁹ A thorough analyses of the consequences of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty can be found in the volume *Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych (Diplomacy or Force? The European Union in International Relations)*, ed. S. Parzymies, Warszawa 2009. In this volume, of particular importance are the studies by S. Parzymies *Unia Europejska jako uczestnik stosunków międzynarodowych (The European Union as a Participant in International Relations)* and by W. Góralski *Rozwój i ewolucja systemu decyzyjnego Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej (Development and Evolution of the Decision-Making System of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy)*.

⁶⁰ See the two thorough studies on this topic by S. Konopacki in “Studia Europejskie” No. 2/1998 and No. 3/1998.

and Spain) could be next in line to experience such a crisis. Despite the 10 May 2010 decision of the EU ministers of finance on rescuing the Eurozone and their designation of EUR 750 billion (USD 1,035 billion) to fulfil this goal, the effects of the crisis could not be prevented and, in November 2010, a further EUR 85 billion (USD 113 billion) had to be assigned as a relief package for Ireland, which ironically not so long ago was considered to be the economic ‘tiger’ in the EU.⁶¹ It should not thus not be surprising that French President Nicholas Sarkozy, in his 2011 New Year’s Address, considered the protection of the Eurozone ‘*the most important challenge in 2011*’. Both Sarkozy and other European critics openly declare that a collapse of the euro would in fact imply a collapse of the project of European integration, which would have tremendous negative consequences not only for Europe, but for the entire world.⁶² Once again, in a quite visceral form, all of those problems and major dilemmas were visible during the latest G20 summit in Cannes in November 2011, when everyone was openly talking about the current crisis in Greece (and Italy), and searching for a solution to the serious European debt prob-

⁶¹ See the interesting Chinese analysis, *Bumpy road ahead for euro*, published on 31.12.2010 on the webpage www.xinhuanet.com. Among the signs of Chinese interest in this crisis was not only the Chinese intervention and assistance provided to Greece during the three-day official visit of Premier Wen Jiabao in Athens in late September 2010, but also the Chinese proposal – not implemented, but significant because of its origins and the timing of its announcement – to ‘save the eurozone’ (as China currently has the largest and most rapidly-growing foreign-exchange reserves, estimated at USD 3,4 billion). For more on the Chinese foreign-exchange reserves see: www.uschina.org. For more on the Chinese proposal of 22.12.2010 for the eurozone, see: *How desperate can you get: EU places hopes on China to rescue euro* on the webpage www.euointelligence.com and *China to the EU’s rescue – again* (suggesting that after the intervention in Greece, there would now be assistance to the entire eurozone) at: <http://arabnews.com/economy/article224461.ece>. What is more, in late 2010 and early 2011, there were announcements in the press that China could provide help in dealing with the crisis to other, EU Member States (after Greece), such as Spain or Hungary: *China and Spain: A brighter future for win-win cooperation*, at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/03/c_13675031.html; *China and Spain BOOT trade ties*, at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4432694.stm>; See also: *Svájcot utánozva válhat valóra Orbán kínai álma (Following Switzerland Orban can implement his China dream)*, this report, citing the Hungarian Minister of Development T. Fellegi, states that China could soon take over securities, at: <http://vallalkozoi.negyed.hu/vnegyed/20101229-orban-viktor-szerint-versenykepesebbek-leszunk-mint-kina.html>. The issue of the unprecedented Chinese activity in European markets is presented, in the most detail so far, in the report of the European Council on Foreign Relations *The Scramble China* by J. Godement, J. Parello-Plesner and A. Richard. According to the authors: ‘China is buying Europe’, at: http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/chinas_scramble_for_europe

⁶² *Sarkozy: upadek euro byłby upadkiem wspólnej Europy (Sarkozy: the fall of the euro would be the fall of the common Europe)*, at: <http://www.wprost.pl>, 1.01.2011. It is also worth pointing out that F. Zakaria, in his book *The Post American World*, op.cit. almost completely ignores the EU, focusing on China and India. Similarly R. Kagan, in his *Return of History...*, op.cit., next to the USA focuses mostly on China and Russia.

lem.⁶³ Finally, having the future of the whole Eurozone in mind, on 22 July 2011, the leaders of the beleaguered Eurozone's 17 Member States announced a massive EUR 157 billion bailout package for Greece.⁶⁴ Another bailout plan for Greece was announced in late October 2011.⁶⁵ But still the crisis has not been overcome yet, with Italy in danger of following Greece as this text is written.

The dynamism exhibited in the activities of the newly established organisations such as the G20 and BRICS, as well as other organisations already existing for some time but recently gaining more importance, such as the EU or SCO, leads to the conclusion that, **in the institutional sense, important changes and reshufflings have taken place in the international arena in recent years, especially after the outbreak of the crisis in the international markets in September 2008. This confirms the thesis presented earlier that the role of the USA in particular (earlier symbolised by the assigning to it of the Bretton Woods system) and of the Western states in general is relatively diminishing (reflected in the EU by the controversies surrounding the Eurozone and the PIIGS phenomenon), while the role of those States jointly referred to as the 'emerging markets' is dynamically growing.** It now depends on the future dynamism of the latter markets, from China through to India, Brazil, South Africa or Indonesia, whether the presently observed institutional change will prove permanent, or whether they only herald deeper and more complex changes to come.

3. The actual configuration of powers in the early 21st century

Information concerning the 'emerging markets' also must begin with China, which in 2009 overtook Germany and became the largest exporter in the world,⁶⁶ and in mid-2010 overtook Japan and became the second-largest,

⁶³ See the most important documents from the summit at: <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2011cannes.html>.

⁶⁴ *Greece gets another bailout from the Eurozone*, at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/22/world/la-fg-eu-greece-debt-20110722-32> (last visited 14.08.2011).

⁶⁵ *Greek politicians signal support for tough bailout plan*, „The Washington Post”, 3.11.2001.

⁶⁶ *China top global exporter in 2009*, at: <http://en.rian.ru/business/20100108/157495037.html>. According to this report, China's October 2009 exports amounted to USD 140 billion, while Germany's exports in the respective period amounted to USD 134 billion. According to another report, the exports of these countries in the period January–October 2009 amounted to USD 957 million and USD 917 million, respectively. *China exceeds Germany to become world's biggest exporter*, on the webpage of the “Global Times” magazine, at: <http://business.global-times.cn/china-economy/2010-01/496655.html>. According to reliable data of the US-China Business Council, China's exports in 2009 amounted to USD 1,202 billion, at: <http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html>

after the USA, economy in the world (third if the EU is considered as a single economy). The relevant data for 2010 are presented in Tables 1 and 2 below:

Table 1. The most important world economies in 2010, according to the IMF

	Country Rank	GDP (millions of USD)
—	World	62,909,274
—	European Union	16,282,230
1	USA	14,657,800
2	People's Republic of China	5,878,257
3	Japan	5,458,872
4	Germany	3,315,643
5	France	2,582,527
6	United Kingdom	2,247,455
7	Brazil	2,090,314
8	Italy	2,055,114
9	Canada	1,574,051
10	India	1,537,966

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_\(nominal\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal))

Table 2. The largest world economies in 2010, according to the World Bank

	Country Rank	GDP (millions of USD)
—	World	63,048,823
1	USA	14,582,400
—	Eurozone	12,174,523
2	People's Republic of China	5,878,629
3	Japan	5,497,813
4	Germany	3,309,669
5	France	2,560,002
6	United Kingdom	2,246,079
7	Brazil	2,087,890
8	Italy	2,051,412
9	India	1,729,010
10	Canada	1,574,052

Source: The World Bank: World Development Indicators database. 1 July 2011. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf> (accessed on 12.07.2011)

Japan and China switched places in mid-2010,⁶⁷ while only two or three years earlier China, quickly growing in power, overtook Germany on this list. Extrapolating from the data presented above, the weekly *The Economist* produced a forecast which indicates that China could overtake the USA as early as in 2019, thus becoming the largest economy in the world.⁶⁸ It should also be noted that the prognoses concerning the growing importance of the Chinese economy were modified in China's favour by virtually all major analytical centres and rating agencies in the world in the last decade.

Other 'emerging markets', particularly India and Brazil, are closely following China's rise, while Russia has, to a large extent, economically 'revived'. The reputable bank and analytical centre Goldman Sachs, which in November 2001 coined the term 'BRIC' in one of its reports, originally predicted that the economies of these four countries could overtake the most developed countries around 2050, and that China would overtake the USA in 2041. After two corrections to this report, they now believe that such a change could occur already in 2027 and that the BRIC economies (without South Africa yet) would overtake the strongest Western economies around 2035.⁶⁹ What is more, the latest report of Goldman Sachs on the then-BRIC of November 2007 contained a chapter entitled *Is Wall Street doomed?* It is interesting and should be noted that this question was raised even before the outbreak of the 2008 crisis. Another element which should be noted is the fact that the BRIC states (not BRICS yet) jointly cover more than 25 per cent of the surface of the globe and contain more than 40 per cent of its population, and that three of the four most populous countries in the world are among the 'emerging markets' which joined the G20: China, India and Indonesia (the latter is also the most populous Muslim country in the world, with a population estimated at approximately 240 million; in third place in population is the USA, with a population of 309 million). Yet possibly the most important

⁶⁷ According to the report *China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy*, "The New York Times", 15.08.2010, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?_r=1. See also: S. Phang, *China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-Biggest Economy*, "Bloomberg News", 16.08.2010. This thesis coincides to a large extent with the prognosis by Professor Hu Angang, who also predicts that '2020 is determined to be the likely year that the PRC will surpass the United States as the world's preeminent economic power'. Hu Angang, *China in 2020...*, op.cit., p. 20.

⁶⁸ *The world biggest economy. Dating Game. When Will China Overtake America?*, "The Economist", 16.12.2010. The date of change of the leading world economy, as predicted by "The Economist," is earlier than Goldman Sachs's predictions, which assume that the trends of the last decade will prevail, maintaining China's annual GDP growth at an average level of 10.5 per cent and the USA's at 1.7 per cent, and taking into account the rate of inflation.

⁶⁹ 'BRICS AND BEYOND' – a Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and the N11 nations, 23.11.2007; at: <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/BRIC-Full.pdf>.

factor connected with the BRICS states – and in particular with China and India, which lead this organisation – is the fact that both these states are in reality continents with ancient civilisations. In China, which until the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century produced approximately 1/3 of the world GDP by itself,⁷⁰ the present trends are considered nothing more than a return to the normal state of affairs, even if for the Western world this is an entirely new qualitative change and challenge.

Just as recently as ten years ago two American authors, Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, wrote: ‘*Globalism today is America-centric*’⁷¹ and many scholars agreed with their assessment. In the first decade after the collapse of the Cold-War order, globalisation was identified with Americanisation,⁷² and not only in the USA.⁷³ Paradoxically, Chinese scholars consider the previous great crisis in world markets, which started in 1997 in Thailand and Indonesia, to be the important turning point which marked the universalisation of the process of globalisation, that is the gradual departure from an American-centred approach and, at the same time, an increase in the importance of China and the whole Asia-Pacific region.⁷⁴ From that moment on, China has become a lender and has repeatedly emphasised its independence in the global markets. This independence is constantly growing and resulting naturally in a marked increase in assertiveness by China in the international arena in general. From that moment on Chinese scholars, followed by politicians, ceased to identify globalisation with Americanisation and Westernisation and began to stress its universal character.⁷⁵ At the same time, they started to emphasise the effectiveness of China’s transformation and development model,⁷⁶ equated with reforms and opening up to the world (*kaige, kaifang*), while still not calling it their own chosen development model. This is due to the fact that both Chinese scholars and politicians are well aware that such a model, if one can already speak of something like that at all, still requires

⁷⁰ See the interesting visualization: *Share of GDP: China, India, Japan, Latin America, Western Europe, United States*, at: <http://www.visualizingeconomics.com/2008/01/20/share-of-world-gdp/>.

⁷¹ J.S. Nye, J.D. Donahue, *Governance...*, op.cit., p. 8.

⁷² J.A. Scholte, *Globalization. A critical introduction*, New York 2000, p. 16.

⁷³ Yu Keping, *Quanqiuhua yu zhengzhi fazhan (Globalization versus Political Development)*, Beijing 2005, p. 213.

⁷⁴ *Quanqiuhua: Zhongguo daolu (Globalization: The Chinese Variant)*, ed. Li Huibin, Beijing 2003, p. 15.

⁷⁵ Yu Keping, *Quanqiuhua...*, op.cit., p. 130.

⁷⁶ Xia Chundao, *Zhongguo guoqin yu fazhan daolu (Chinese National Specificity and the Paths of Development)*, Beijing 2010, p. 35, 36. Especially important in this respect is the recent volume by a scholar from Singapore, Zheng Yongnian, *Zhongguo Moshi. Jingyan yu Kunju (The Chinese Model. Experience and Difficulties)*, Hangzhou 2011.

much work and streamlining, and the Chinese transformation is far from being complete.⁷⁷

Now however, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, entirely new tones have entered the internal Chinese debate. It seems that the strategy employed so far, originating in Deng Xiaoping's once very popular concept of the so-called 28 Chinese characters, which involved not striving for first positions but instead waiting behind and gathering strength,⁷⁸ has changed into an entirely new concept, involving a 'grand renaissance of the Chinese nation', based on uniting the Chinese powers (including Taiwan) and rapid economic and technological development.⁷⁹ Because this strategy has already resulted in many huge successes, at the end of 2010 new theses were put forward, proposing that China should 'step out of the shadow', 'abandon the mentality of a weak state' and 'take international responsibility worthy of a global superpower'.⁸⁰ Such voices were, until recently, unheard of in the Chinese public and political discourse. We should attentively observe China's development, as the processes taking place there will, to a large extent, determine the economic near-future of the world.

However, in this context we should also note the warnings given by experienced diplomats. Kishore Mahbubani reminds us that: *'Throughout history, there has always been rising tension between world's greatest power and the world's greatest emerging power.'*⁸¹ Henry Kissinger, in his recent volume *On China*, writes: *'I am aware of the realistic obstacles to the cooperative U.S. – China relationship I consider essential to global stability and peace. A cold war between the two countries would arrest progress for a generation on both sides of the Pacific. It would spread disputes into internal politics of every region at a time when global issues such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, energy security, and climate change impose global cooperation.'*⁸²

⁷⁷ *Think again: It may not be China's century*, <http://www.xinhuanet.com>, 08.03.2010. For more on the notion of the 'Chinese model' see B. Góralczyk, *The Role of China...*, op.cit., and the volume edited by Yu Keping, Huang Ping and others, *Zhongguo Moshi yu 'Beijing Gongshi' (The Chinese Model and 'Beijing Consensus')*, Beijing 2006.

⁷⁸ For more, see: K. Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere...*, op.cit., p. 224.

⁷⁹ For more, see: B. Góralczyk, *Chiński Feniks. Paradoxy rosnącego mocarstwa (The Chinese Phoenix. Paradoxes of a Growing Power)*, Warsaw 2010, p. 313 and following.

⁸⁰ Wang Haiyun in the "Global Times", 07.11.2010.

⁸¹ K. Mahbubani, *Can Asians Think?*, op.cit., p. 199.

⁸² H. Kissinger, *On China*, New York 2001, p. 522.

Conclusions: Will we reach a new order?

Edward Hallett Carr, one of the 'fathers' of the field of international relations, is said to be the author of the following words: '*No crisis, no discipline*' (concerning international relations, of course).⁸³ In other words, the best time for theoretical studies of international relations and for their practical ordering is when the world is in a crisis or at an important turning point. The last such watershed, connected with the fall of the USSR and the collapse of the communist camp, brought with it, as already mentioned, the domination of neo-liberalism and the conviction that the markets play the role of the main power in the international arena, while at the same time the state and its interventionism become weaker. Even in neo-realist conceptions, the significance of economic events has become much more important, resulting in their inclusion in the mainstream discourse, next to those factors which were once considered the most important, such as power and security.⁸⁴

There is no doubt that the 2008 economic crisis could prove to be another 'turning point'. The neo-liberal determinism has been abolished, and not only China and Russia have begun proposing theses on the dominating role of the states in managing the shocks resulting from globalisation.⁸⁵ At the same time, the 'unipolar moment' that marked American hegemony has ended, at least in the economic sense.⁸⁶ Once more, just as after the Westphalian Treaty (Osnabrück and Münster) and following other important turning points in the history of mankind, we are facing the challenge of 'crossing from the old world to the new world'. The major concern is that, since 1648, when a new order was developing it was always preceded by a deep crisis, conflict, and war. Now, however, as was the case with the collapse of the Cold-War order, no such conflict exists and none appears even close (at least in the near future). But still, the character of the new powers which recently emerged in the global arena incline us to propose the thesis that the outline of a new global order is emerging, and that it is very different from the 'old order'.

In the short, one-generation-long period following the collapse of Communism in 1989–91, what has suddenly now become the 'old world' was char-

⁸³ L.J. Kiss, *Globalizálódás...*, op.cit., p. 11.

⁸⁴ T. Łoś-Nowak, *Paradygmat realistyczny – projekcje porządku międzynarodowego w XXI wieku (The Realist Paradigm – Projections of the International order in the 21st century)* in: *Porządek międzynarodowy...*, op.cit., p. 28; L.J. Kiss, *Globalizálódás...*, op.cit., p. 25.

⁸⁵ See M. Castells' postulates in the third volume of his trilogy, *Koniec tysiąclecia*, op.cit., p. 292. See also: D. Rodnik, *The Globalization Paradox...*, op.cit., p. XVI, XVIII.

⁸⁶ One of the first to predict America's decline in importance, even long before the 2008 crisis, was Niall Ferguson: *Kolos...*, op.cit., e.g. p. 38, 313. G. Soros was also critical, e.g. in the work *The Bubble of American Supremacy*, New York 2004.

acterised by the unprecedented domination of the USA in all possible spheres. During the classical era of the rule of sovereign of states, still important but slowly receding, dominance, prestige and influence were connected with power (political, economic, military or technological). The main problem today, in the era of globalization and the network society, is that a nation state, even one as strong as the USA, is no longer the most important source of legitimisation.⁸⁷

In the presently emerging ‘new world order’, two powers are clashing and we are witnessing two major processes. On the one hand, the constantly deepening processes of globalisation are leading to a ‘transnationalisation’ of foreign policy and international relations. States are no longer the sole sovereigns in the world. The importance of non-state actors, particularly supranational corporations, is constantly growing. There is, therefore, open talk about phenomena such as ‘the retreat of states’, or even their ‘extinction’.⁸⁸ In this new era, the economy, capitals, money and information have broken free of the control of states, which is why more and more experts are speaking of ‘the end of the classical era’⁸⁹ and its replacement by the ‘global’ or ‘network’ society. According to Dani Roderik, the main problems and challenges of this era are due to the fact that ‘*there is no global antitrust authority, no global lender of last resort, no global regulator, no global safety net, and, of course, no global democracy. In other words, global markets suffer from weak governance*’.⁹⁰

We already know that the 2008 crisis has proven the neo-liberal conceptions wrong.⁹¹ And the new centres of power which matter now, starting with China, and Russia, seem to refer in their practice to the rules of state interventionism in internal policies and to have a strictly classical view on the notion of power in the international arena (constantly referring to the five rules of peaceful coexistence – *pancha shila*). Even if the anti-liberal, statist ‘Beijing Consensus’ has not yet fully developed and is definitely not yet a universal

⁸⁷ M. Castels, *Sila tożsamości*, op.cit., p. 74.

⁸⁸ J.A. Scholte, *Globalization...*, op.cit., p. 21.

⁸⁹ A. Giddens, *The New International Relations. Theory and Practice*, London-Paris 1998, p. 7.

⁹⁰ D. Rodrik, *The globalization Paradox...*, op.cit., p. XVI.

⁹¹ Naomi Klein has also accused neo-liberalism of many lies, even stating that ‘*This book is a challenge to the central and most cherished claim in the official story – that the triumph of deregulated capitalism has been born of freedom, that unfettered free markets go hand in hand with democracy. Instead, I will show that this fundamentalist form of capitalism has consistently been midwifed by the most brutal forms of coercion, inflicted on the collective body politic as well as on countless individual bodies*’, N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine...*, op.cit., p. 18. It must be admitted that Klein’s disquisition is particularly vivid, and even though it is a bit biased, it still gives a lot to think about.

model, its birth and the shaping of it – in the form of ‘Chinese development model’ (*Zhongguo Moshi*) – should still be strictly linked to the collapse of the liberal ‘Washington Consensus’.

It is not clear how far China and the other ‘emerging markets’ will go in promoting multilateralism in the classical sense, that is in shaping the centres of power, just as it is also not certain what the final shape of the ‘Chinese development model’ will be. So far it is still in the stage of transformation and creation. Both these issues are important in the context of the **second major process taking place in the global arena, according to which there is an emerging and rapidly growing awareness of the challenges which nation states are not able to, and will not be able to, deal with on their own.** Some of these ‘global challenges’ were quite well defined in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals of 2000. Issues such as regional stratification and inequality of income (including starvation), resource deposits of states (today, we can easily picture future conflicts over energy resources and even drinking water), climate change and degradation of the environment, next to global terrorism or the ‘oldest’ of them, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, require a strictly global approach and cannot be resolved by local solutions. These challenges are a threat to the human race as a whole and even life on earth as such, and not just to one state or group of states. Therefore, the answers to these challenges can only be global.

While looking for answers to the new challenges, experts in the field of security have developed an entirely new concept of ‘co-operative security’.⁹² This idea is based on the paradigm that, in order to prevent further conflicts on the globe, people have to cooperate and not compete. It seems that a similar challenge is presently faced by theoreticians and practitioners in the sphere of international relations. As postulated by Zygmunt Bauman, a ‘global code of conduct’ is necessary. However, how and by whom should it be developed remains an open issue. It is certain that its development will not be a simple task, as: 1) the concepts of global governance have never gotten beyond the stage of theoretical discussion; 2) the only universal system currently in existence, namely the UN, has been in a state of crisis for many years and there is no indication it will be able to get out of it;⁹³ 3) the ‘emerging

⁹² From among the rich literature on this topic, it is worth mentioning the studies by R. Cohen and M. Mihalka with the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen 2001.

⁹³ As the authors of a course book for international relations in the era of globalization, John Baylis and Steve Smith, wrote: ‘phenomena such... as the increasing concern with terrorism and injustice in the world suggest that further changes and adaptations of the UN system will be necessary’. *The Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations*, New York 2005, p. 521 (translated from the Polish version).

markets' are a new category, not yet completely defined, and it is not certain what they will propose to the world in the longer run, although presently it seems that their most serious 'common bond' in the G20 and in BRICS is a common anti-Western platform, not a set of universal values; and 4) it remains an open issue whether China will create a development model which will be attractive enough for others to copy it (due to the specificity of the Chinese state, this seems rather doubtful), as well as whether something like an 'East-Asian model',⁹⁴ opposing the concepts nurtured and well-established in the Western world, could be developed.

Amitai Etzioni posits that, in the modern globalised world, the notion of power should be perceived on three planes – coercion, normative, and remunerative – and consequently is composed of military, idea and money power.⁹⁵ If we accept this paradigm, **the world at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century looks much different than ten or twenty years ago. The diffusion and diversification of power has deepened. Military power remains primarily with the USA;**⁹⁶ **in the world of ideas there is a struggle of conceptions, with a visible 'twilight' of neo-liberalism, and with new wave of neo-authoritarianism and statism promoted by China and Russia running strong; while in the world of money (or rather foreign-exchange reserves), China is presently the unquestioned leader.** Will the deregulation resulting from globalisation be substituted by regulation? It is hard to tell what should be the origin of the 'ordering factor' in international relations (as postulated by Roman Kuźniar).⁹⁷ However, it is certain that today, more than ever before, the whole of mankind needs ordering in the sphere of international relations. Can we, in accordance with the spirit of the times, reach some single transnational vision of international relations⁹⁸ in a world where not only mutual dependencies are growing, but also a strong opposition is emerging along the axis: Western states – emerging markets?

So far, the increasing mutual dependencies (financial, technological, scientific, cultural) resulting from the globalisation processes are overlapping with the recently strengthened process of an increasing sense of identity, par-

⁹⁴ P.Khanna, fascinated by the economic effectiveness of China, Singapore or Malaysia, writes about the possible existence of such a model in: *Second World...*, op.cit., p.267, 281.

⁹⁵ *Power Shift...*, op.cit., p.308.

⁹⁶ The available data, indicating that the USA spends more on armaments more than all the other largest countries combined, constitutes explicit proof of this. See: *Military expenditure as share of GDP, 2003–2008*, <http://www.sipri.org>.

⁹⁷ R. Kuźniar, *Stosunki międzynarodowe in transition (International Relations in Transition)* in: *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza...*, op.cit., p.472. The Author is the Chief Foreign Policy Adviser to the President of Poland.

⁹⁸ For such a vision, see: S.P.Sałajczyk in: *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza...*, op.cit., p.50–57.

ticularly with those who, so far, have felt like and in fact have been ‘outsiders’. With this, the dilemma presented by Immanuel Wallerstein gains in importance: will the division of the world into a centre, peripheries, and semi-peripheries deepen⁹⁹, or will we manage to walk the path towards a more universal system, in which issues connected with our responsibility to deal with global challenges will move to the foreground? This once again raises the question whether we will be building our future on the basis of ‘the West and the Rest’,¹⁰⁰ or whether the sense of responsibility for all of us as a species will prevail. At the time of writing this text, both options are ever more clearly pronounced, but it remains hard to predict what will come out of this. At the conclusion of this article I would like to stress my belief that, without a common, global responsibility for the crucial matters of our ever smaller – in terms of time and space – world, we will go down. Such a solution is surely desired by no one. However, at least one new factor, which introduces something entirely new to the contemporary international stage, can be taken as a given even now: **the new order will no longer be developed only by the West,¹⁰¹ as has been the case not only in the recent decades but over centuries.** In this sense, the world has a new quality in the practical dimension, even though the ramifications are not yet absorbed and processed in the theoretical sense. Once again, as was in the case with the end of the Cold War – which was predicted by virtually no one – practice seems to be ahead of theory.

⁹⁹ I. Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis. An Introduction*, Durham, NC 2004, p. 11.

¹⁰⁰ E. Halizak, in the volume: *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza...*, op.cit., p. 405–446.

¹⁰¹ A similar thesis is proposed by S. Bieleń in the volume *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań...*, op.cit., p. 42.